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30 August 1945

Miss Rose Conway
The White House

My dear Miss Conway:

I think the attached memorandum with regard to some observations on German labor submitted by one of our analysts will be of interest to the President. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

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30 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You may be interested in some observations on German labor, submitted under date of 9 August by one of our best resident analysts of the European trade union movements.

2. On the whole, it is reported that local NA officials have done "an understanding and intelligent job" of encouraging union formation. Now that permission to form trade unions on a Kreis level may be granted locally, some officials are bringing unions quickly to life. In other localities, opposition or reluctance have delayed official steps. The general trade union situation still remains "spotty".

3. There is an almost instinctive trend toward a single unified trade union movement instead of several movements.

4. In the formation of unions, there exists a difference between the Russian and other zones. The American theory has been that organization should start from below with election of shop stewards and culminate with establishment of the union. The Russians work in reverse, forbidding shop elections until the union is established on top. There may be little actual difference since potential trade-union leaders and shop-stewards maintain unofficial contact and render mutual support.

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5. Another difference in approach is the Russian requirement that the head of the railroads trade union and the Reichsbahndirektor must jointly approve all important railway measures. The workers are obviously interested in a continuance of this practice. Whether the practice has expanded to other industries in the Russian zone is not known.

William J. Donovan
Director

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30 August 1945

Honorable James F. Byrnes
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

You may be interested in some observations on German labor, submitted under date of 9 August by one of our best resident analysts of the European trade union movements.

On the whole, it is reported that local MG officials have done "an understanding and intelligent job" of encouraging union formation. Now that permission to form trade unions on a Kreis level may be granted locally, some officials are bringing unions quickly to life. In other localities, opposition or reluctance have delayed official steps. The general trade union situation still remains "spotty".

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Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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OSS Form 1084b

DATE 27 August 1945TO: The Director, Strategic Services

I am attaching a report from
 Van Arkel on German labor. It is the best
 I have seen. I thought you would be
 interested.

Outs.

FROM:

David C. Shaw *DL**2144*
*2278 Q**Class*

(32816)

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August 3, 1945

German

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The general trade union situation is quite spotty; on the whole it seems to me that local MG officials have done an understanding and intelligent job (considering the terrific burdens under which they operate) within the limits of perhaps too restricted directives which are now being rapidly eased in the light of the understandings reached at Potsdam. The most notable manifestation of this latter is that requests for permission to form trade unions on a Kreis level can now be approved locally instead of coming, as was originally contemplated, to USGCC for action and approval, which means a considerable saving of time. In some places sympathetic MG officials have allowed matters to move quite rapidly and in other opposition or reluctance have delayed any official steps to bring the unions to life.

It is interesting that the argument which so occupied the refugees - should there be one or several trade union movements? - has hardly been discussed among the trade unionists themselves; in all zones and in all circles, with trifling exceptions, an almost instinctive unified movement has been planned. This is perhaps the most encouraging of all present developments; the Christian Trade unionists, the KPD and the SPD automatically set together whether on the top or the lowest level. There is one significant theoretical difference between the Russian and the other zones; our theory has been that they should be formed from the bottom up, beginning with the election of shop stewards, then works' councils, then zone unions, and finally the constitution of a top level trade union movement; the Russians on the other hand have allowed the establishment of the central committee immediately and have forbidden the holding of elections within the plants so that if the workers desire representation it must necessarily take place through the trade unions already set up. In practice, I suspect that the difference is slight for in the western zones the former trade union leaders maintain an unofficial contact and see that people in whom they have confidence are elected shop stewards and in the Russian zone I am sure that they have proposed as shop stewards those anti-Nazis whom the workers would in any case choose for themselves.

There is one problem which it seems to me holds promise of becoming central; in the Russian zone the head of the trade union on the railroads and the Reichsbahndirektor are jointly required to approve all important measures, whether they relate to finance, purchases, personnel or whatever; they have jointly completed a trip to de-Nazify personnel on the railroads, for example. How true this is of industry in the Russian Zone (little enough since the Russians, it is clear beyond a doubt have carried off almost everything moveable), I do not know, but if generalized it will raise some interesting problems when these matters become of four power concern since the workers are obviously interested in a continuance of this practice and will not lightly let it drop. In general, I have the idea that if we had the political set-up of the Russian Zone and the

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economic policy of the American or British zone, we would be in a really enlightened era; unfortunately, for the French policy - if one exists - I think there is nothing to be said.

The problem of de-Nazification goes along slowly, too slowly. But in fairness to the Americans here it seems to me that some of the recent articles I have read are pretty uninformed on this matter. To begin with, MG has the most stupendous tasks - foreign workers, returning prisoners, a critical agricultural situation, a destroyed country and inadequate personnel. Few of them speak German. The Germans themselves are such liars, or deceive themselves so easily, that each one is ready to protest his anti-Nazi resistance work and only careful and long checking with reliable people (who are difficult to find) can reveal the truth. A very substantial progress has in fact been made and as the various sections of USMC and USFET get to work on particular areas (industry, labor, medicine, etc.) a thorough going over is in order, so that while we all regret the spottiness of the work done up to the present, it does not seem to me to be the cause of concern that some of the American press seems to make it. There are few Germans who were not compromised to some extent with the Nazis and perfect purity is not, I fear, obtainable.

There is another, and I think interesting, factor working on this problem. The shortages in Germany are so huge that there is a general tendency - since nothing covers the needs - to say "Take it from the Nazis first"; in housing for example after the first days the anti- or non-Nazis come around with lists of Nazi homes to present the billeting and requisitioning officers. I wonder whether the thoroughness with which the Russians have cleared out their zone may not have this political effect; that since a lot of people will have to starve they will, in sheer desperation be forced to say "Let the Nazis starve first". Increased rations for those coming out of concentration camps are the first step in such a campaign which may well become an important political factor, as the movement is carried down through its logical succeeding steps.

The recent change in American policy particularly vis-a-vis the Germans is quite noticeable; the old days of "You started it - now you can pay through the nose" are over and instead we hear nothing on the radio except that so many military trucks are made available for transport, so many new factories opened, rations increased here and there - in short a campaign (I surmise a reaction to the clever though false propaganda which the Russians put out over Radio Berlin) to convince them that the Americans are doing wonders. This seems to me almost as deplorable as the earlier line; quite apart from the justified requests of the Dutch, Norwegians, French and other still suffering peoples "where do we come in?" It will probably irritate in the Germans who, I think we can agree behaved on the whole and with notable slight exceptions, quite badly during the Nazi period, a feeling that we are here for their convenience and to do them good. Manifestations of this spirit are already frequent and irritating - as might be expected principally from former sympathizers or politically colorless persons - and proceed on the assumption that it is up to the Americans (and I assume the same is true of other zones as well) to see that every German has a good home, a fine government and free movies. Needless to say that this does

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not apply to those Germans who were genuinely anti-Nazi and did something about it; for them freedom from the Gestapo is all that they ask. But they are pathetically few.

I suspect that on the whole the Americans are going to do a good job in their zone; up to date little has actually happened except that the Army has gotten itself dug in to do the job and now is ready to start on it - which is not too long considering the difficulties of finding places, getting messes set up, locating furniture and office space, and the other physical but essential preliminaries to working. That process is now over and people are looking around; a measure of order has been created, most of the foreign workers have already been sent home (a plague since they did much looting even of Allied materials; only a small percent contributed but they made any orderly life impossible particularly the Poles and the Russians), the Poles are rather rapidly being released and now things are settled down. New German officials have been installed in most important posts and have again learned the habits of authority vis-a-vis their own people. American and British planning and staff are months ahead of the French and Russian - the latter particularly seem to have had no ideas worked out at all, and on the whole the choice of American personnel seems to me very good; people who know their jobs and are interested in them. The New Deal flavor which is everywhere should assure a measure of liberalism in the handling of problems and, though they will have a lot of disappointments and delays, the German liberals will not, I think, have serious reason to complain that Allied objectives are at variance with their own. Nor, frankly, can I feel too troubled about some of those minor delays and disappointments; the German left, along with a lot of the rest of us, is also to blame in this affair and cannot now in justice it seems to me demand that we immediately cut their house in order in exactly the way they would like to have it. In most places the anti-Nazi forces have not even removed the pro-Nazi signs and I deplore the myth which seems to spring up here and there that MG has somehow prevented the German anti-Nazis from rising up in their wrath and throwing out the Nazis. It is an unhappy fact that in a great many German cities the Nazis would today be in power if the local political forces were left to work without Allied interference; a tribute to Nazi thoroughness but also a sign of the weakness of the German left.

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan.
 FROM : Executive Office.
 SUBJECT: R&A work on serial numbers.

DATE: 27 August 1945.

1. You may wish to mention the R&A work on serial numbers in your talk Wednesday. By organizing the collection of serial numbers at one central point from all types of German equipment; then working out a theoretical pattern of their distribution overtime, R&A personnel in London made estimates of tank, gun, artillery, motor vehicle, tire, ammunition, flying bomb and rocket production. The R&A estimates were the first ones supported by detailed evidence, and the first giving a month-to-month picture. Previous estimates were based on "bits and pieces" from PW interrogations, intercepts, aerial photos of plants, pre-war data, etc.

2. The R&A estimates now can be compared with actual production data. The estimates show an average error of less than 10 percent. In the case of 90 percent of the estimates the error was very small.

3. In general the R&A estimates were quite a bit lower than the estimates based on other information. They showed the Germans to be less strong in armaments production than had been supposed. This was important in estimating strategic capabilities. Moreover, the estimates were refined down to a plant basis and served as an indication of the results of specific bombing operations.

4. The serial numbers technique was adopted for the Pacific and served as the basis for estimating Jap aircraft production, as well as other armaments. In B-29 aircraft output was estimated both on the basis of serial numbers and intercepts (the Air Ministry did most of the work).

John D. Wilson
 John D. Wilson.

17,367

Perman
X Production X Lab.
X Econ. Warf. Div.
X Plans, I. W.
 27 August 1945.

Dear Mr. Pineus:

Thank you for your letter of 2 August 1945 and the memorandum on Serial Number Analysis which accompanied it. It is seldom that we have an opportunity to check accurately the results of a theoretical technique of economic intelligence as we have in this instance, and the results are indeed gratifying.

As you know I was most interested in encouraging the development of estimates of enemy munitions output from serial numbers, particularly when I saw that this information was not being widely used either in the field or in Washington. We were fortunate in having men with the ability and initiative of Captain Sidney Alexander, Mr. Ruggles and Captains Peel and Farber who could, once given the opportunity, organize the flow of information and devise the necessary techniques for using it. Their contribution, and that of their assistants, has been a significant one of which OSS is proud. In order that their experience can be of use if ever needed in the future, I am asking Mr. Ruggles to prepare a full report on the techniques they employed. I shall see that this report is given suitable distribution.

May I take this occasion also to recall that PEA was always helpful in assisting in this serial number work, both in North Africa and later in London, under the direction of Mr. Niefler, Mr. Stone and yourself. Of this I have always been very appreciative.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan,
 Maj. Gen., AUS,
 Director.

Mr. Irwin Ben Pineus,
 E.O.S./American Embassy,
 40, Berkeley Square,
 London, W.1.

DATE _____
 TO: Gen Donovan

I suggest the
 attached letter be
 sent to Prince,

you will notice
 the suggestion regarding
 Ruggles preparing ~~and~~ a
 report. He intends to do
 so but would be
 encouraged by a request
 from you. May I convey
 your interest to him thru
 Dr Langer?

FROM: John Dillon
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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

E.O.U./ AMERICAN EMBASSY
40, BERKELEY SQUARE, LONDON, W.1.
TELEPHONE GROSVENOR 4961.

*German
Production
Tunale
8200 W.S. for
J.V.
Pincus*

Major-General William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

August 2 1945

Dear General Donovan:

I am taking the liberty of forwarding a copy of a report on the accuracy of serial number studies on German production prepared in this office by four members of R. & A., OSS - Capt. Fred Peel, Lt. Henry Brody (U.S.N.R.), Mr. Richard Ruggles and Capt. William Parker. The first three of these men, who did most of the work in preparing the original studies from 1943 through 1945 and who have prepared the enclosed study, have returned to R. & A., Washington. Capt. Parker remains attached to the OSS Mission to Germany.

Speaking as an FEA man who has worked closely with OSS, I think that the much higher accuracy shown in the studies prepared by this group than in the studies prepared by other agencies using the same techniques gives OSS real cause to feel proud of a fine contribution made in aid not only of the Air Forces but of people engaged in predicting the probable order of battle strength of ground forces before and after the invasion. This seems to me to be particularly true when I recall the obstructions and difficulties placed in the way of the work of this unit by representatives of some very high headquarters - not the least of which was G-2, Washington.

I am sending the report to you directly because I am sure you will want to examine it and keep the results in mind in connection with your interest in the application of similar techniques in Japan.

Sincerely yours,

Irwin Nat Pincus
Irwin Nat Pincus

INTEL.

Enclosed Report - "Serial Number Analysis as an Intelligence Technique", dated 18 July 1945.

To: EOU/American Embassy,
Flat 52,
40, Berkeley Square, London, W.1.

This is to acknowledge receipt of copy ¹ ~~(XXXX)~~
of EOU report(s), entitled, "SERIAL NUMBER ANALYSIS AS AN.....
INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUE"

Date.....

Name.....

Rank.....

Organisation.....

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Economic Warfare Division
AMERICAN EMBASSY
40 Berkeley Square, London

SERIAL NUMBER ANALYSIS AS AN INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUE

A report on the accuracy of estimates
of production of German military equipment,
prepared by the Economic Warfare Division,
American Embassy from serial numbers and
other markings.

18 July 1945.

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TANKS AND GUNS ON TANK CHASSIS

Tanks, Total Production

Assault Guns on Tank Chassis, Total Production

Production by Plant

Tank Output Estimates Based on Bogie Wheel Tire Markings

Conclusions

HALF TRACKS

ARTILLERY

MOTOR VEHICLES

Total Production

Production by Plant

Conclusion

TIRES

Total Production

Production by Plant

Conclusion

FLYING BOMBS

ROCKETS

The purpose of this paper is to assess as far as possible the accuracy of the production estimates of enemy military equipment based on the direct evidence of serial numbers and other markings on the equipment. From the summer of 1943 to March, 1945 the Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy issued intelligence reports based on the analysis of markings. In general these reports contained three types of analysis.

1. Aggregate output data by time period for specific types of military equipment.
2. Pipeline analysis, that is, length of time between manufacture and use at the front, of specific types of military equipment.
3. Production by individual manufacturers of specific types of military equipment.

The direction of the investigations was guided partly by the availability of the data, and partly by the needs of the intelligence consuming agencies. Often markings were procurable which could have yielded considerable information, but for which the need did not warrant the expenditure of effort. Again, some subjects were of considerable interest but the effort which would have been required in the field to obtain the necessary markings was beyond what this organization could muster. Some work was done on all of the following items:

1. Tanks
2. Assault Guns
3. Half-Tracks
4. Guns
5. Motor Vehicles
6. Fires
7. Flying Bombs
8. Rockets
9. Ammunition

Most of the individual plant figures used to check the serial number estimates were obtained by a field team sent out for the purpose. Some plant output figures were furnished by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. The checks against over-all production were furnished by the production statistics captured from the Speer Ministry.

The plans of individual German factories showed that the enemy's plans used by EWD to calculate enemy production was in fact correct. The Germans numbered both components and finished

equipment serially. They used the serial numbers as controls of the individual units as they were being produced and as records for the purpose of repairs, spare parts, and defective pieces of equipment. They neither skipped numbers nor used numbers more than once. There is no indication that the Germans suspected that serial numbers were a source of information to us. It is interesting to note in this connection that the Germans themselves estimated the production of Russian tanks by using serial numbers.

This report examines the accuracy of the estimates of tanks, assault guns, half-tracks, motor vehicles, tires, guns, flying bombs, and rockets. No check is possible on the studies on enemy ammunition, which contained no estimates of output but simply reported the pipeline of ammunition of various calibers which was captured in Italy and France.

A general presentation of all the estimates for which comparable actual data exists is given in Chart I. Here each estimate and the corresponding actual data are plotted on a scatter diagram. Those estimates which are correct lie on the 45° line.

Only those estimates which are individual and unrelated to each other have been plotted. Thus the yearly estimates by type or model have been used rather than the aggregate figures. In this way the data is shown in its most critical light since in cumulative figures the serial number estimate errors tend to balance out and any one large error is easily absorbed.


It is interesting to note that all large errors of serial number estimation were errors of under-estimation. For over 90% of all the estimates, however, the errors are not of sufficient magnitude to impair the validity of the analysis.

The record of the serial number estimates, as shown in Chart I and in the subsequent studies of each type of equipment analysed, proves that the method of analysis employed is a valid and valuable source of economic intelligence. Within the range of its capabilities the technique of utilizing markings taken directly from enemy equipment is infinitely superior to the more abstract methods of estimating production, such as reconciling the often widely divergent prisoner of war reports, basing estimates on pre-war capabilities, or projecting trends in production on estimates of the general level of economic utilization of resources in an enemy country. All of these methods were used at different times by allied intelligence agencies with results that do not bear comparison with those obtained from the analysis of serial numbers.

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TANKS AND GUNS ON TANK CHASSIS

The first preliminary study of German tank production based on an analysis of serial numbers was issued in July, 1943. This original investigation was extended and revised in a series of subsequent reports issued through March, 1945, which covered production of tanks and assault guns by types and makers and calculations of the pipeline from assembly to front line use.

Tanks, Total Production

Table I, below, summarizes the tank output estimates by year and by type and compares them with production figures obtained from the Speer Ministry. Total annual tank production is presented in graphic form in Chart II. Estimates are from the 1 January, 1944 study, the 27 September, 1944 study, and extensions and corrections made in later papers. The biggest error in estimating annual tank production was for 1940, where output was overestimated 39%. All the other yearly over-all tank production estimates are less than 15% in error.




TABLE I

A Comparison of Tank Production Estimates from Serial Numbers with Speer Ministry Statistics, by Year and by Type, 1940-1944, with the Percentage Error by Year.

<u>1940</u>	Estimate of 1 Jan:1944	Corrections of 27 Sept:1944.	Speer Ministry Statistics.
Mark I & II	300	300	9
Mark III	870	900	895
Mark IV	400	450	280
38 (t)	380	380	275
TOTAL	1,950	2,030	1,459
ERROR	34% +	39% +	
<u>1941</u>	Estimate of 1 Jan:1944	Corrections of 27 Sept:1944.	Speer Ministry Statistics.
Mark I & II	295	295	233
Mark III	1,530	1,600	1,845
Mark IV	480	550	480
38 (t)	480	480	698
TOTAL	2,785	2,925	3,256
ERROR	14% -	10% -	
<u>1942</u>	Estimate of 1 Jan:1944.	Corrections of 27 Sept:1944.	Speer Ministry Statistics.
Mark I & II	240	240	306
Mark III	1,930	2,000	2,555
Mark IV	650	1,100	964
Mark VI	100	100	78
38 (t)	480	480	195
TOTAL	3,400	3,920	4,098
ERROR	12% -	4%	
<u>1943</u>	Estimate of 27 Sept:1944.	Corrections of 27 Nov:1944.	Speer Ministry Statistics.
Mark I & II	0	0	77
Mark III	400	400	349
Mark IV	2,700	2,700	3,073
Mark V	2,900	2,050	1,850
Mark VI(B)	650	650	647
TOTAL	6,650	5,800	5,996
ERROR	11% +	3% -	

TABLE I (Cont)

<u>1944</u>	<u>Estimates</u>	<u>Speer Ministry Statistics.</u>
Mark IV	2 March, 45-3,300	3,366
Mark V	27 Jan, 45 -3,200	3,964
Mark VI (E)		
(1st 6 mths)	27 Sept, 44 - 475	553
TOTAL	6,975	7,883
ERROR	11% -	

Table II and Chart III classify the tank production estimates by type and compares them with the Speer Ministry statistics. In all cases the latest output estimate for a given year has been used. The total error in estimating each tank type has been expressed as a percentage of the correct figure. The estimates covered in Table II are only those for which Speer Ministry figures are available for comparison. Limitations on the data available made it necessary to express estimates in the 1 January, 1944 study in terms of "Probable" and "Maximum" and this classification has been carried over in Table II. The estimates represented in Chart III are the "Probable" estimates.

TABLE II

A Comparison of Tank Production Estimates from Serial Numbers with Speer Ministry Statistics, by Type, 1940-1944, with Percentage Error by Type.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Date of Most Recent Estimate.</u>	<u>Estimate Probable</u>	<u>Estimate Maximum</u>	<u>Speer Ministry Statistics</u>
Mark I & II	1940	1 Jan. 1944.	300	500	9
	1941	"	295	480	233
	1942	"	240	420	306
	TOTAL, 1940-42		835	1,400	548
	ERROR		53% +	155% +	
	20(e)				
Mark II	1940	1 Jan. 1944.	380	-	275
	1941	"	480	-	698
	1942	"	480	-	195
	TOTAL, 1940-42		1,340	-	1,168
	ERROR		15% +		
	Mark III				
Mark III	1940	1 Jan. 1944.	870	940	895
	1941	"	1,530	2,100	1,845
	1942	"	1,930	2,700	2,565
	1943	27 Sept. 1944.	400	400	349
	TOTAL, 1940-43		4,730	6,140	5,647
	ERROR		16% -	9% +	
Mark IV	1940	1 Jan. 1944	400	480	280
	1941	"	480	680	480
	1942	"	650	950	964
	1943	27 Sept. 1944.	2,700	2,700	3,073
	1944	2 Mar. 1945.	3,300	3,300	3,366
	TOTAL 1940 - 44		7,530	8,060	8,163
ERROR			8% -	1% -	




TABLE II (Cont)

<u>Type</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Date of most recent estimate.</u>	<u>Estimate</u> <u>Probable Maximum</u>	<u>Speer</u> <u>Ministry</u> <u>Statistics</u>	
Mark V	1943	27 Nov. 1944	2,050	-	1,850
	1944	27 Jan. 1945	3,200	-	3,964
TOTAL, 1943-44			5,250		5,814
ERROR			10% -		
Mark VI(E)	1942	27 Sept. 1944.	100	-	78
	1943	27 Sept. 1944.	650	-	647
	Jan-Jun. 44"	" "	475	-	553
TOTAL, 1942-June, 1944			1,225		1,278
ERROR			4% -		

The only attempt made to estimate tank output more closely than by year was with the Mark V. In the 27 January, 1945 study, Mark V production in 1944 was broken down by quarters. Table III compares these quarterly estimates with quarterly output figures from the Speer Ministry.

TABLE III

A Comparison of Quarterly Mark V Tank Production Estimates with Speer Ministry Statistics, 1944.

<u>1944.</u>	<u>Estimate</u> <u>of</u> <u>27 Jan. 1944</u>	<u>Speer</u> <u>Ministry</u> <u>Statistics</u>	<u>Percentage</u> <u>Error</u>
Jan-Mar.	600	851	29% -
Apr-June	720	1,070	33% -
July-Sept.	930	1,102	16% -
Oct.-Dec.	1,050	941	12% +

The percentage of error for the first half year is large and, while the trend in production was estimated correctly for the first three quarters, the estimates failed to note the drop in output in the last quarter.

Assault Guns on Tank Chassis, Total Production

Table IV below, compares the total annual assault gun or sturmgeschütz estimates with the figures from the Speer Ministry. The estimate of 1943 sturmgeschütz output in the 27 Sept. 1944 study was not an overall figure for assault gun production and included only two types for which comparable figures are available, the St.Kfz.142 on a Mark III chassis and the Hernet. Accordingly the 1943 figures from the Speer Ministry are given for only these types.

TABLE IV

A Comparison of Sturmgeschütz Production Estimates From
Serial Numbers with Speer Ministry Statistics,
1940-1943

<u>Year</u>	<u>Date of Most Recent Estimate</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Speer Ministry Statistics</u>	<u>Percentage Error</u>
1940	1 Jan. 1944	150	184	18% -
1941	1 Jan. 1944	450	550	18% -
1942	1 Jan. 1944	600	2,076	71% -
1943	27 Sept. 1944	1,400	3,708	62% -

No estimate of assault gun production in 1944 was made except for the Jagd-Panther. Jagd-Panther production in 1944 was estimated in the 27 Jan. 1945 study to be 100. Actual production was 215.

Production by Plant

At the time of the 1 Jan. 1944 study there was not sufficient data to allow a division of tank and sturmgeschütz production between plants. However, eight tank assembly plants were listed with the models they had produced through 1942. Six of these factories have been visited and their production records did include the models identified with them in the 1 Jan. 1944 study.

In the report of 27 Sept. 1944 seven assembly firms were listed with the 1943 production which had been linked with them. However, these figures were not presented as the total output of those plants because in the case of every model except the Tiger there was a residue of production on which the data was not sufficiently complete to allow assignment to a firm. In this study one error was made -- the assignment of Mark V production under the code "osh" to Henschel. In the 27 Jan. 1945 report on Mark V's this was changed and the code "osh" was correctly identified as MNH, Hannover. All Tiger production was correctly assigned to Henschel, Kassel.

Mark V production in 1944 was divided among three assemblers in the 27 Jan. 1945 report. This distribution in percentage terms, compared with the actual percentage of total production of the same three firms, based on their own production figures, is as follows:

	<u>Estimated</u>	<u>Correct</u>
M.A.N.	40%	35%
Daimler Benz	29%	31%
M.W.H.	28%	31%
Unknown	3%	3%

In a memorandum issued 16 October, 1943 it was stated that all the direct evidence available pointed to only two engine producers at that time for Mark I, II, III, IV, and VI tanks--Maybach, Friedrichshafen and Rordorff, Berlin. Investigation of German tank engine plants has shown that this statement was correct.

Tank Output Estimates Based on Bogie Wheel Tire Markings

In the summer of 1944 the demand for estimates of tank output at a time when little recent chassis number data was available led to the use of a complex technique for deriving a rough approximation of tank production from the mold numbers on tank bogie wheel tires. By taking the bogie wheel tire markings from a small number of tanks, estimating the number of molds for each tire size (the size varied with the tank type), applying British experience to arrive at the monthly capacity of each mold, and estimating the rate of wastage of the tires an estimate of the magnitude of tank chassis assembly of a given type which could occur about two months after the date of tire production was arrived at. This method of analysis resulted in a figure for the capacity for production in a given month, not for actual production.

While this technique could not be expected to produce estimates as accurate as those obtained from an adequate sample of chassis, gearbox, engine, and gun serial numbers from the tanks directly, the results were surprisingly good. Estimated monthly rates of tank production based on this method and the comparable figures from the Spear Ministry are given in Table V.

TABLE V

A Comparison of Mark IV, V, and VI Monthly Tank Production Estimates Based on Bogie Wheel Tire Markings with Spear Ministry Statistics, August, 1943 -- February, 1944.

<u>Tank Type</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Estimated Monthly Production</u>	<u>Actual Monthly Production</u>	<u>Highest Monthly Production to Date.</u>
Mark IV	Aug. 1942	100	80 (average for 1942) ?	
Mark IV	Feb. 1944	400	252	368
Mark V	Feb. 1944	270	276	299
Mark VI	Feb. 1943	20	32	32
Mark VI	July 1943	60	65	65

All the estimates are quite close except the Mark IV estimate for Feb. 1944. Production in this month was far below the peak capacity that had already been attained. The bogie wheel method was very accurate in that it correctly estimated productive capacity for each type of tank.

Conclusions

Investigation of the numbering systems used by tank assemblers and engine and gearbox makers has confirmed the theory of tank serial numbering upon which the tank and Sturmgeschütz estimates were based. Most of the variations which occurred between the tank estimates and the true production figures are not a reflection on the adequacy of the techniques of analysis employed, but rather reflect the limitations of the data available for interpretation.

The 1942 estimate of sturmgeschütz output was badly in error because the data received from the field did not cover a multitude of assault gun models which were being produced on a small scale. Since adequate coverage for these models was impossible, it was felt that estimates made for later years should not attempt to present any over-all figure for tank and assault gun production.

The record of the tank serial number estimates is extremely good in comparison with other estimates made by Allied intelligence agencies. Table VI below, is a comparison of estimated average monthly production rates for 1940-42 from serial estimates and from Munitions Record No. 24, 10 Aug. 1942, with the corresponding figures from the Speer Ministry. The estimates from Munitions Record No. 24 were furnished to G-2 by O.S.S. and represented the opinion of intelligence agencies at that time, both in Washington and in the Ministry of Economic Warfare, London.

TABLE VI

A Comparison of Monthly Tank Production Estimates, from Serial Numbers and from Other Intelligence Sources, with Speer Ministry Statistics, 1940-1942.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Estimated Monthly Production</u>		<u>Monthly Production, Speer Ministry</u>
	<u>Serial Number Estimate</u> 27 Sept. 44	<u>Munitions Record</u> 10 Aug. 42	
June, 1940	169	1,000	122
June, 1941	244	1,550	271
Aug., 1942	327	1,500	342

HALF TRACKS

Production of German half-tracks was estimated by type and by assembler for the years from about 1938 through 1942 and the motor vehicle production report, April, 1944. These estimates were extended, with minor corrections in the 1941 and 1942 figures, in "German Half-Track Production, 1941-1944", issued 9 March, 1945.

Table VII, below, gives a comparison of the total half-track estimates from 1941 through 1944 with Speer Ministry statistics for the same years. Total yearly estimates vary in accuracy from .2% to 15%.

TABLE VII

A Comparison of Total Annual Half-Track Production Estimates from Serial Numbers and Speer Ministry Statistics, 1941-1944.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimates of 9 March 45</u>	<u>Speer Ministry Statistics</u>	<u>Percentage Error</u>
1941	7,850	8,436	7% -
1942	9,500	10,150	6% -
1943	17,000	16,971	.2% +
1944	15,550	17,134	15% -
Total, 1941-44	49,900	52,691	7% -

Table VIII, below, compares the estimates with Speer figures by type and by year wherever comparable figures are available.

TABLE VIII

A Comparison of Half-Track Production Estimates from Serial Numbers and Speer Ministry Statistics, by Type and by Year, 1940-1944

<u>Type</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Date of Estimate</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Speer Ministry Statistics</u>	<u>Percentage Error</u>
1-ton	1940	April 44	2,850	3,096	
	1941	(No comparable figures available)			
	1942	9 March 45	4,200	4,208	
	1943	9 March 45	5,300	5,624	
	1944	9 March 45	1,600	2,563	
	Total		13,950	15,491	10% -
3-ton	1940	April 44	1,650	1,076	
	1941	(No comparable figures available)			
	1942	9 March 45	2,200	2,762	
	1943	9 March 45	7,000	6,303	
	1944	9 March 45	8,000	9,108	
	Total		18,850	19,249	2% -
8-ton	1940	April 44	300	348	
	1941	9 March 45	300	360	
	1942	9 March 45	300	564	
	1943	9 March 45	300	563	
	1944	9 March 45	300	729	
	Total		1,800	2,564	41% -

TABLE VIII (cont.)

Type	Year	Date of Estimate	Estimate	Spoer Ministry Statistics	Percent- age Error
8-ton	1941	9 March 45	1,450	1,320	
	1942	9 March 45	1,650	1,392	
	1943	9 March 45	3,300	3,251	
	1944	9 March 45	3,500	3,298	
	Total		9,900	9,261	7% +
12-ton	1940	April 44	550	516	
	1941	9 March 45	800	828	
	1942	9 March 45	850	840	
	1943	9 March 45	400	507	
	1944	9 March 45	400	602	
	Total		3,000	3,293	9% -
18-ton	1941	9 March 45	250	240	
	1942	9 March 45	300	384	
	1943	9 March 45	650	643	
	1944	9 March 45	750	834	
	Total		1,950	2,101	7% -

While a complete record of half-track production by plants is not available, data has been collected which covers, at least partially, the production record of eight firms. These statistics were collected principally at the plants themselves. Table IX contains a comparison of these figures with the estimates by plant from serial number data.

TABLE IX

A Comparison of Half-Track Production Estimates for Nine Firms with Actual Output Figures, 1939-1944.

Firm	Type	Year	Date of Estimate	Estimated Output	True Output	Percentage Error
Adler	1-ton	1939	April 44	500	832	
		1940	April 44	1,000	933	
		1941	9 March 45	800	844	
		1942	9 March 45	900	983	
		1943	9 March 45	1,400	1,695	
		1944	9 March 45	(no cases)	0	
	Total			4,600	5,287	13% -
	3-ton	1941	9 March 45	250	165	
		1942	9 March 45	500	554	
		1943	9 March 45	1,250	1,351	
		1944	9 March 45	1,600	2,133	
	Total			3,600	4,203	14% -
Auto Union	3-ton	1943	9 March 45	2,400	2,210	
		1944	9 March 45	3,200	4,083	
	Total			5,600	6,293	11% -
Borg-Warner	6-ton	1944	9 March 45	1,400	1,173	11% +
Wilmington	1-ton	1943	9 March 45	300	468	36% -
		1944	9 March 45	(no cases)	0	
W.A.O.	5-ton	1943	9 March 45	300	370	19% -
		1944	9 March 45	(no cases)	0	
Daimler-Benz	12-ton	1939	April 44	200	157	
		1940	April 44	300	262	
		1941	9 March 45	300	320	
		1942	9 March 45	300	343	
		1943	9 March 45	(no evidence of Production)	204	
		1944	9 March 45	"	22	
	Total			1,100	1,317	16% -

TABLE IX (cont)

<u>Firm</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Date of Estimate</u>	<u>Estimated Output</u>	<u>True Output</u>	<u>Percentage Error</u>
Hanomag	3-ton	1940	April 44	900	581	
		1941	9 March 45	600	907	
		1942	9 March 45	800	1,136	
		1943	9 March 45	1,700	1,577	
		1944	9 March 45	1,700	1,720	
		Total		5,700	5,921	4% -
Krauss-	Maffei 8-ton	1944	9 March 45	1,100	1,177	7% -
		1944	9 March 45	1,000	1,005	.5% -
		1941	9 March 45	50	10	
		1942	9 March 45	50	106	
		1943	9 March 45	150	179	
		1944	9 March 45	(no cases)	25	
Vomag	18-ton	Total		250	320	22% -

Half-track chassis numbers were in simple consecutive series for each firm and each type. Production in succeeding years followed in the same serial number bands. Correct analysis was, therefore, merely a matter of establishing the location of each year's output in the number band. This became somewhat more difficult for 1943 and 1944 when the Germans ceased putting the year of production on the chassis nameplate. Thereafter the chassis had to be dated by dates appearing on other components. Such errors as occurred were due to a failure to get enough numbers to locate definitely the terminals of each year's production. This is most apparent in the case of the 5-ton half-track, where the upward trend in production could not be detected because the whole analysis for 1940-1944 was based on only 11 cases. In this case it was felt, however, that it was better to give an approximation of the magnitude of output, even if it were not accurate, in order to present a complete picture of half-track production in all sizes.

ARTILLERY

Two reports on gun output were issued on the basis of serial numbers. Production of the 7.5 cm. Pak 40 was estimated for 1942 and the first quarter of 1943 in a study issued 15 March, 1944. Production of the 5 cm. Pak 38 was estimated for 1940-1942 on 20 May, 1944. In addition to these two reports, output of the 7.5 cm. KwK 40 L/48 was estimated for 1944 as an aid in arriving at the production of Mark IV tanks in the Mark IV report of 2 March, 1945 and output of the 7.5 cm. KwK 42 L/70 for the Mark V tank was estimated for 1943 and January-August, 1944 and for 1943 and 1944 in the Mark V reports of 27 November, 1944 and 27 January, 1945.

Estimates for the three 7.5 cm. guns listed above can be checked, in part, against Speer Ministry Statistics. The comparison is as follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimated Production</u>	<u>Actual Production</u>	<u>Percentage Error</u>
7.5 cm. Pak 40	1942	2,200	2,112	4%
7.5 cm. KwK 40	1944	3,300	3,360	2%
7.5 cm. KwK 42	Jan-Aug. 44	2,200	2,522	13%
7.5 cm. KwK 42	1944	3,350	4,210	20%

Estimates of gun production were not carried out on a large scale because it was felt that they were not of sufficient interest. The above figures, however, are sufficient to show that the serial number technique is applicable to this type of equipment.

MOTOR VEHICLES

The first report on German motor vehicle production based on serial number analysis was issued 16 October, 1943 and contained preliminary figures for nine manufacturers. A comprehensive study of motor vehicle production was put out in April, 1944. This included estimates of output by type and by maker for Germany and Occupied Europe. In order to present a picture of the entire industry, rough estimates of production by the French plants and by the smaller German firms were included and were based on ground intelligence where adequate serial number data was not available. The April, 1944 study covered production from 1940 through 1942. This was the last motor vehicle study issued. An estimate of Volkswagen production through May, 1944 was made in a set of Intelligence Notes issued 5 August, 1944.

Total Production

It has not been possible to find statistics on German motor vehicle production of all types for comparison with the serial number estimates. There are, however, Speer Ministry figures covering German truck production in 1942 and they compare with the truck production estimates from serial numbers as follows:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Estimate of April, 1944</u>	<u>Speer Ministry Statistics</u>	<u>Percentage Error</u>
Light Truck	16,500	14,436	15% +
Medium Truck	62,300	53,439	17% +
Heavy Truck	18,500	11,982	55% +
Total	97,300	79,827	22% +

The consistent tendency to overestimate which is shown above does not appear in a comparison of estimates with actual figures for individual plants. It is possible that the Speer figures cover only truck production for military use and do not include output for the civilian economy. This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that the same Speer Ministry figures for 1944 production are consistently below the figures given in a German motor vehicle production plan for 1944 (dated 27 September, 1944). For example, Speer figures for the medium truck in 1944 are 25% below those given in the above-mentioned plan.

Production by Plant

Some production statistics from Opel, Daimler-Benz, Messing H.A.G. and Volkswagen are available for comparison with the serial number estimates. These are presented in Tables X-XIV, below.

TABLE X

A Comparison of Opel Production of 3-Ton Trucks with Serial Number Estimates for the Same Model, 1939-1942.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimate of April, 1944</u>	<u>Actual Production</u>
1939	18,000	15,485
1940	17,500	18,023
1941	16,500	15,947
1942	16,800	18,262
Total	68,800	67,717
Total Error: .1% +		

TABLE XI

A Comparison of Daimler-Benz Motor Vehicle Production with Serial Number Estimates, 1941-1942.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Estimate of April, 1944</u>	<u>Actual Production</u>
1941	Light Truck	3,000	2,272
	Medium Truck	10,500	9,441
	Heavy Truck	2,000	1,959
	Passenger Car	5,000	9,063
	Total	20,500	22,735
	Total Error: 10%	-	
1942	Total*	18,000	18,718
	Total Error: 4%	-	

* Daimler-Benz production was not estimated by type for 1942.

TABLE XII

A Comparison of Missing M.A.G. Production of 4-Ton Trucks With Serial Number Estimates for the Same Model, 1940-1942.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimate of April, 1944</u>	<u>Actual Production</u>
1940	5,500	5,040
1941	4,500	5,400
1942	6,500	4,320
Total	16,500	14,760
Total Error: 12% +		

TABLE XIII

A Comparison of Volkswagen Production of Type 82 Jeeps with
Jeeps with Serial Number Estimates for the Same
Model, 1940-1943.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimate of 5 Aug., 1944</u>	<u>Actual Production</u>
1940	1,000	853
1941	8,000	4,634
1942	9,000	8,776
1943	17,500	18,339
Total	32,500	32,602
Total Error:	.3% -	

TABLE XIV

A Comparison of Volkswagen Production of Amphibious Jeeps With
Serial Number Estimates for the Same Model, 1942-1943.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimate of 5 Aug., 1944.</u>	<u>Actual Production</u>
1942	0	598
1943	9,000	7,896
Total	9,000	8,494
Total Error: 6% +		

Conclusion

The motor vehicle serial number estimates were successful in giving an approximation of the magnitude of German truck production. This success is striking in view of the previously-held opinion of intelligence agencies that German truck production was in the neighbourhood of 200,000 vehicles. On the individual plant level the estimates, insofar as they can be checked, were extremely accurate in assessing the relative importance of the firms and in listing the types they made.

TIRES

The first report employing the serial number method to estimate production was "Axis Europe's Tire Industry," issued in October, 1943. This report included pneumatic tire output data on German factories, a general study of types, sizes, and rubber composition of tires, and estimates the pipeline between aero tire manufacture and use in theatres of operation--all based on direct evidence from tire markings. In "Tire Production in Germany and Occupied Europe", July, 1944, the tire production estimates were expanded to include every plant in Germany and every country in Occupied Europe through the end of 1942 or the first quarter of 1943. Output was also estimated by size on the basis of the tire mold markings. A separate paper, estimating the yearly rate of rubber consumption in enemy territory was put out 12 July, 1944. An analysis of trends in the proportions of natural and synthetic rubber used in tires in 1942 and early 1943 was issued 15 September, 1944.

Total Production

The July, 1944 study estimated monthly production of truck, passenger car, and aero tires in Germany in the first quarter of 1943. The following is a comparison of these estimates with Speer Ministry statistics for average monthly production in all of 1943:

Type	Estimated Average Monthly Production Jan.-Mar., 1943.	Actual Average Monthly Production 1943	Percentage Error
Truck and			
Passenger Car	147,000	159,700	8% -
Aero	28,500	26,400	8% +
Total	175,500	186,100	6% -

The estimated yearly rate of rubber consumption for Germany and Occupied Europe was arrived at by taking the serial number estimates of tire production, breaking the tire output into size groups on the basis of the number of molds in use for each size, and multiplying the output by the weight of rubber in a representative size for each size group. After making an allowance for rubber used to retread tires, the ratio of rubber used in pneumatic tires to rubber for other uses in Great Britain was applied to Germany, giving a figure of 135,000 tons for total annual enemy rubber consumption. This figure of 135,000 tons was based on late 1942 and early 1943 tire output estimates. Actual enemy rubber consumption, from the files of I.G. Farben, was 136,000 tons in 1942 and 141,600 tons in 1943. The estimated consumption on the basis of serial number data, then, was .7% below the 1942 figure and 5% below the 1943 figure.

Production by Plant

The only firm for which complete monthly production figures covering the period of the estimates could be obtained was Continental. Monthly output of the Hannover plant of Continental from 1939 through March, 1943, compared with the monthly estimates for that period in the

July, 1944 report, are contained in Chart IV. While the estimated figures follow actual production trends closely in Chart IV, the monthly estimates, in general, tended to fluctuate more sharply than did output. The yearly estimates for the Hannover plant for the same period compare with actual production as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimated Production</u>	<u>Actual Production</u>	<u>Percentage Error</u>
1939	2,124,000	2,029,000	5% +
1940	973,500	821,000	19% +
1941	875,800	826,000	6% +
1942	862,400	820,000	5% +
Jan-Mar. 43	203,500	179,000	14% +
Total	5,039,200	4,675,000	8% +

The Continental tire production at Korbach was mistakenly attributed to the Continental-owned Peters Union plant at Frankfurt in both tire studies. The estimated monthly tire output in this serial numbers series for 1940, 1941, and January-June, 1943 and the actual production for the same period are shown in Chart V. Complete figures on output at Korbach in 1942 are not available. Changes in output from month to month were estimated closely, but the estimates were consistently high. The comparison of yearly figures on Korbach tire output and estimated output are as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimated Production</u>	<u>Actual Production</u>	<u>Percentage Error</u>
1940	163,500	144,500	13% +
1941	114,000	80,900	41% +
Jan-Jun. 43	54,900	41,800	32% +
Total	332,400	266,900	25% +


Estimates of Continental solid artillery and bogie wheel tire output based on serial numbers were confined to a 10-month period from July, 1941 to April, 1942. Use of serial numbers on solid tires was discontinued by Continental in the following month. Average monthly production during this 10-month period was estimated at 48,500 solid tires. Actual monthly production was 45,350, or an error of 3%.


Actual tire production figures for Dunlop, Hanau are available only for 1943 and later years, and the only comparison possible with the serial number estimates is for aero tire production in 1943. On the basis of serial number estimates for the first five months of 1943, total 1943 aero tire production was estimated at 108,800. Actual production was 93,467--an error of 13%.

In the case of Phoenix, Hamburg, also, only 1943 and later data is now available, and the only comparison possible

CHART IV
MONTHLY PRODUCTION OF MOTOR VEHICLE AND AERO TIRES,
ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL, FOR CONTINENTAL, HANNOVER
1939-MARCH, 1943.

— ACTUAL PRODUCTION
--- ESTIMATED PRODUCTION





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is with the estimated production for January and February, 1943. Tire output for these two months was estimated at 25,200. This compares with an actual production of 18,981, or an error of 33%.

Conclusion

Total German tire production and rubber consumption were estimated very closely. The estimates by plant which could be checked were invariably too high. In the case of Continental, Hannover this overestimation was not large, but for Continental, Korbach it amounted to 25%. These overestimations were probably due to the inclusion of motorcycle tires in the same serial number bands as motor vehicles and aero tires.

FLYING BOMBS

Three reports on flying bomb, or V-1, production were prepared on the basis of serial number data. A preliminary study was issued 25 July, 1944 which estimated output up to the end of June, 1944. On 16 August, 1944 another study was issued, incorporating practically the same conclusions as the preliminary paper on production through June and extending the estimates to cover July. These estimates were based on serial numbers on two components, the air grid and the fuel control units. The third study, 14 September, 1944, was based on an analysis of fuselage numbers in conjunction with the serial numbers on components. This paper did not change or extend the conclusions of the August study other than in stating that there appeared to be only one main assembler of flying bombs during the period April 20 to June 1.

The production estimates contained in the 16 August, 1944 report were as follows:

Prior to 20 April, 1944	4,000 (maximum)
Production 20 April to 30 April	2,000
Monthly rate, May, 1944	7,000
" " , June, 1944	7,000
" " , July, 1944	<u>11,000</u>
Total production up to August, 1944	31,000

Complete flying bomb output figures, have not as yet been found. Mr. Georg Rickhey, a director of the Mittelwerke flying bomb plant, has given monthly figures relating to production at Mittelwerke and Volkswagenwerke, but not including output at Brunswick, Stettin. Total 1944 production and total monthly production of V-1's from September, 1944 to March, 1945 are given in Speer Ministry documents. In spite of the fact that the monthly figures from Rickhey include only two plants, they are often larger than the total monthly figures given in the Speer Ministry statistics.

Mr. Rickhey stated from memory that about 10,000 V-1's had been produced when the first V-1 was launched against England, and that during this early period Volkswagen at Fallersleben had been the sole producer. For the same period serial number estimation had calculated that 13,000 V-1's had been produced, and that there had been only one producer.

Documents and interviews have revealed that the flying bomb program was planned for 6,000, but that this level of output was never attained due to lack of sheet metal for assembly. Production was probably more in the 2,500-3,500 a month magnitude as indicated by both Speer Ministry and Rickhey statistics. This is only one-

third to one-half as large as was estimated by serial number analysis. The error in the serial number estimates is probably due to the fact that there was little correlation between the component production and assembly. The estimates were based largely on the numbers on air grids and fuel control units which ran in simple series from zero up. The assembly of flying bombs apparently absorbed only a part of this production because of the sheet metal shortage.

ROCKETS

Five reports estimating rocket production and identifying some of the makers of rocket components were issued on the following dates: 13 October, 1944, 7 November, 1944, 15 December, 1944, 1 February, 1945, and 9 March, 1945. Output estimates were based on an assembly serial number which was stencilled on the peroxide tank, the venturi, and several other components. The series of papers issued represented, not corrections of previous estimates, but extensions of the time covered by the estimates. The output figures in these studies were as follows:

<u>Date of Report</u>	<u>Date for Which Production Was Estimated</u>	<u>Cumulative Production</u>	<u>Daily Rate of Production</u>
13 Oct., 1944	15 Sept., 1944	670 (minimum)	-
7 Nov., 1944	29 Oct., 1944	1,700 (minimum)	-
15 Dec., 1944	24 Nov., 1944	2,400 (minimum)	about 20
1 Feb., 1945	15 Jan., 1945	3,500	20-25
9 Mar., 1945	15 Feb., 1945	4,200	20-25

These estimates were the most nearly current reports on German production of all the serial number studies. In the five studies issued the lag between the dates for which production was calculated and the dates of the reports varied between nine and twenty-eight days. This was due both to the short pipeline between assembly and firing of the rockets and to the rapidity with which the data was collected and analyzed.

Rocket production statistics are available from the Speer Ministry for the months from September, 1944 through March, 1945 and for total 1944 production. With these figures it is possible to work out fairly close approximations to actual production for the periods covered by the serial number estimates. The comparison is as follows:

<u>Period for Which Production Was Estimated</u>	<u>Estimated Production</u>	<u>Actual Production</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Up to 15 Sept., 1944	670 (minimum)	1,000	67%
15 Sept.-29 Oct., 1944	1,030	900	103%
29 Oct.-24 Nov., 1944	700	600	117%
24 Nov.-15 Jan., 1945	1,100	1,100	100%
15 Jan.-15 Feb., 1945	700	700	100%

Average daily production of rockets for the months from September, 1944 to February, 1945 varied from month to month from 20 to 25. This compares with the serial number estimates of a daily output of 20 to 25.

An examination of Mittelwerke, near Nordhausen, the rocket assembly plant, showed that the serial number band used to estimate output was in fact the assembly serial number. A record of the serial numbers of the rockets assembled each day from 30 January, 1945 to 9 March, 1945 was found by the assembly line at Mittelwerke. A comparison of the date of assembly and the date of incident of 12 rockets made during this period whose numbers were obtained from fragments in England showed that the average time between assembly and firing was nine days. This compares with an estimated pipeline of one week, which was used in the serial number reports in placing the date of assembly of the various serial numbers. In other words, the rocket reports were only two days off in placing the date of manufacture of individual rockets.

The first report underestimated total production by 1,200, and, as a result, a constant error of about 1,000 was carried through all the subsequent rocket studies in the estimates of cumulative production. Probably this error was due to an earlier production series for experimental purposes, none of which were fired on England and Belgium.

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DESCRIPTION SOURCE: Scott, London Office ADDRESSED TO: WJD DOCUMENT DATE: 23 May 45 DOCUMENT NO.: 17,098 COPY NO.: NO. OF PAGES: 3 ATTACHMENTS:	REGISTRY ACCESSION NO.: DOTY 708 ACCESSION DATE: 23 JUNE 45 OFFICE OR BRANCH: D.O. LOGGED BY: MJS
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INDEX SHEET

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DISCUSSION SUBJECT: Boston Office ATTACHED TO: 21 DATE: 23 May 45 NUMBER: 17,088 NAME: [illegible]	REGISTRY ACCESSION NO.: 1075 798 ACCESSION DATE: 23 June 45 OFFICE OF: [illegible] EMBOSSED BY: [illegible]
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[illegible]

TOP SECRET

12 May 1946

German 17.8

Winston M. Scott (1.g.)
X-2 German Section

23 May 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: Major General William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services

FROM: Winston M. Scott, Lt. (1.g.) ^{WMS}
X-2 German Section

SUBJECT: Cable London-Berne 9047

The attached notes give brief summaries of positions in the German Intelligence Service and careers of the persons named in the subject cable.

Enclosure - 1 copy of notes (TOP SECRET)

TOP SECRET

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SCHIEDLER, Arthur

SS Sturmabfuhrer, HEYDRICH's adjutant in 1937.

HOETTL, Dr. Wilhelm

SS Sturmabfuhrer. Important member of Italian and head of Croatian section of Amt VI NSDA. Deals particularly with the organization of the intelligence and sabotage networks in Italy and Croatia. In December 1943 reported to have moved his headquarters to Vienna.

HOETTSCH, Werner

SS Sturmabfuhrer, Krim. Kom. Early member of the SD. Belonged to Amt III/3 from which he was sent to command Blockstelle Vienna in 1938. Said to have gone to the Propaganda Ministry in 1943. Great friend of WANKE.

WANKE, Wilhelm

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer, Krim. Kom. Took part in Putsch of July 1934. Formerly in Austrian Army; fled to Germany and joined the Gestapo. Attached to the SS (Amt III/3) at Blockstelle Vienna. Was in Propaganda Ministry in 1943.

NOTE: SS Contacts with HOETTL

HOETTL

Has been in contact with Alan Dulles in Switzerland. He has reported on the separatist movement in the upper Austria of the SS. (A scheme originating within the ranks of the Austrian SS, the majority of whom are Austrian nationalists, which was to liquidate Nazi party and SS elements who favored fanatic continuation of the war, and to arrange an orderly transfer of administration to Western powers.) KALTENBONNER was allegedly contacting Austrian resistance movements through HOETTL. Subsequent reports indicate that KALTENBONNER may have been trying to use HOETTL and HOETTL to entice western powers with Austria. HOETTL is known to have been in close touch in the summer of 1944 with Hungarian and Slovak circles in contact with Berlin.

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KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst

SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Pol. Chief of the RSHA. Appointed Nazi Party's Legal representative for Austria (about 1932). Is said to have taken part in the Nazi Putsch of 1934 which led to the murder of DOLLFUS. When Germany occupied Austria was appointed Secretary of State for Police in Austrian and HSSuP for Vienna, Niederdonau and Oberdonau. Successor to REYDRICH as chief of Sipo & SD. (Directed plan for liberation of MUSSOLINI and insisted on evacuation of the Jews from Italy (Oct 43). Oct. 44 appointed Chief of RSHA.

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INFORMATION

ROUTING SHEET

Originator Gen. DonovanDate 2 May 1945

Addressee _____

Date Rec'd _____

Subject German National Redoubt

To	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments Indicate action desired or taken
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		
Gen. Magruder					
Director					

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

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0021

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 758 US ARMY

Ref. No. X-1536

Copy No. 35

25 March 1945

Study of the
GERMAN NATIONAL REDOUBT

- I. INTRODUCTION.
- II. FACTORS FOCUSING ATTENTION TOWARD NATIONAL REDOUBT
 - A. Possible Plans
 - B. Current Dispositions
- III. EXAMINATION OF AREA AND ENEMY RESOURCES.
 - A. Terrain
 - B. Communications
 - C. Material Resources
 - D. Subsistence
 - E. Enemy Strength and Strategic Reserves
- IV. CONCLUSIONS.
 - A. Enemy Capabilities
 - B. Discussion

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0021

STUDY OF THE GERMAN NATIONAL REDOUBTI. INTRODUCTION.

This is a study of the enemy situation regarding the factors and capabilities involved in the defense of a mountainous area, "THE REDOUBT", to which it is reported National Socialism will withdraw its remaining forces for a final, historic, "last man" stand.

It is believed, however, that the designated area can more logically be termed the "REDOUBT Center", inasmuch as all of Germany is surrounded and in fact constitutes a REDOUBT under constant attack at this time.

The "REDOUBT Center" lies generally east and west, contains some of the highest ground of the TYROL, BAVARIAN, AUSTRIAN and ITALIAN Alps, and extends generally from SWITZERLAND and the BOHEMIAN to VIENNA and from the ITALIAN border to SALZBURG (see attached map).

II. Factors Focusing Attention Toward the National Redoubt.A. Possible Plans

Many plans for eventually defending the REDOUBT Center are indicated in numerous reports from what are considered fairly reliable sources. The following examples state, in substance:

1. A German officer in Italy states that his troops would withdraw to become part of the Army Group being formed in AUSTRIA for the defense of the Redoubt.

2. Himmler has ordered that provisions be provided in the VOERARBERG in February for 100,000 men.

3. 1,000 Signal Corps men trained for mountain warfare have recently arrived in the VOERARBERG.

4. It is reported that with Hitler and Himmler, the Nazis will defend with 50 crack units of from 1,000 to 4,000 men each.

B. Current Dispositions

Probably more significant than the reports themselves is the present disposition of the enemy's forces. Considering the gravity of the situation in northeast and northwest Germany, the enemy's continued occupation in strength of Northern ITALY and the BALCAN area is hard to justify if the Redoubt theory is disregarded. Equally difficult to explain is the location of one of his most significant forces, the Sixth SS Panzer Army, in the VIENNA area. Sensitivity in the Vienna area has been evident since last October and Sixth SS Panzer Army's employment there has continued despite the loss of RUSSIA, EAST PRUSSIA and POLAND.

Although, according to accepted standards, the enemy has been beaten for some time, he shows every evidence of determination to continue the battle wherever possible regardless of cost in men, material and territory.

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and a skillful, determined continuation of the conflict must be expected as long as there remains a semblance of an army and terrain to defend.

From a geographical standpoint, the present dispositions and probable intentions of the Allied armies tend to force the enemy to withdraw into Southern Germany and eventually into the Redoubt Center.

III. EXAMINATION OF AREA AND ENEMY RESOURCES IN MEN AND MATERIAL FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE STRUGGLE.

A. Terrain

The terrain which comprises the Redoubt Center presents the most compact, mountainous, inaccessible area available to the enemy. It lies generally E-W, contains the highest ground of the TYROL-BAVARIAN, AUSTRIAN and ITALIAN Alps, and extends generally from the BODENSEE to VIENNA and from the ITALIAN border to SALZBURG. Its extreme relief (to 12,000 feet), narrow, abrupt valleys and sheer winding roads make it admirable for a determined defense by a minimum force well armed with modern equipment.

However, the enemy's capability "to withdraw successfully into the Redoubt Center" must be considered with regard to a much broader terrain picture than that of the Center itself. It must consider those intermediate positions which protect the final withdrawal into the Redoubt Center. In this picture the following main features must be taken into account (see attached map):

1. On the east:

a. The WHITE CARPATHIAN Mountains commanding the strongly defended VAE River line from VIENNA to the JABLUNKA Pass.

b. The SUDETENS or SUDETAN Mountains, running along the NE border of CZECHOSLOVAKIA from JABLUNKA Pass to vicinity DRESDEN. This range carries defense previously prepared by the GERMANS.

c. THE GEBIRGE Range (WARTSDORF - SELB).

d. THURINGIAN Forest and Range (SELB - EISENACH).

e. BOHEMIAN Forest and Range (SELB - VIENNA).

f. FRANCONIAN Jura, a high scarp lying generally in a semi-circle E and S of ERMENBERG.

These features constitute natural delaying lines on which the German right flank, hinged on VIENNA, can successively fall back.

2. On the west:

a. BLACK FOREST.

b. OBERWALD.

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c. SPESSART.

d. HOHE RHOD.

Four fairly high, rugged, wooded mountain areas slightly echeloned to the east as they extend from LOERACH - FREIBURG - KARLSRUHE - FRANKFURT - FULDA - EISENHACH.

e. FRANCONIAN HEIGHTS. Low scarps which are part of the MAIN escarpments and lie NE-SW, west of NUERNBERG.

f. SWABIAN Jura (Alps). Rugged, abrupt, NE-SW range hinged on LOERACH at SW and reaching a point NE of ULM about 25 miles from the FRANCONIAN Jura.

B. Communications.

Easy movements of men and materiel into the Redoubt Center take place over a good road and rail net which continues to function adequately despite heavy bombing attacks.

The road and rail nets are both good and run generally N-S, connecting EMPURT - EISENHACH - WEIMINGEN - SCHWENNFURT - WURTZBURG - NUERNBERG with STUTTGART - ULM - ANSBURG - and MUNICH.

The cross net runs generally NW-SE, joining KARLSRUHE - STUTTGART - ULM - MUNICH and VIENNA with the famous Autobahn reaching east to MUNICH and SAKEN and north from MUNICH through NUERNBERG.

There are additional routes leading directly south from this net which connect the PO Valley with the MUNICH area by way of the Alps.

Road and rail nets within the Redoubt Center are limited by extremely mountainous terrain, but existing roads are good though winding. This net generally follows the NE-SW valleys, although on the northern and southern edges, roads lie approximately N-S along the stream lines of tributaries to the DANUBE River and the PO River.

The main rivers flowing E and NE from the Redoubt Center are the ELBE, LECHE, ISAR, INN, AGGER and RHOD. The INN, flowing NE from vic ST. REMIG (Switzerland), passes through LANDER and INNSBRUCK and follows a somewhat more northerly route through ROSENHEIM to PASSAU. The INN provides the main valley for traffic through the Redoubt Center.

C. Material Resources.

The industrial potentials of the Redoubt Center necessarily would be limited, but there have been a few reports of specific items of ordnance or munitions being laid aside in the Center. Himmler is said to have earmarked several months' production of Germany's best arms and munitions for the Redoubt Center. Other reports stated:

1. Three to five very long trains of war materiel have moved from the [REDACTED] plant each week (since 1 Feb 1949) through VIENNA and west with [REDACTED] listed as the unloading point. A new type of gun has been reported observed on many of these trains but numerous cars are closed and sealed.

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3. Another report mentions a factory within the Redoubt Center capable of producing a "complete Messerschmidt."

3. Guns, ammunition and maintenance should be comparatively easy to conserve due to the fact that the enemy holds extremely advantageous ground which should materially reduce normal attrition. In such terrain his losses of material "on the road" and in subterranean dumps should be cut to a minimum.

4. Other reports indicate that complete machine ordnance shops are being built underground - many connected by tunnels and run by hydrop-electric power. Thus the enemy should be able to keep his materiel fairly well abreast of battle demands for some time.

The armament and munitions works of the PILSEN - PRAGUE area and the industrial facilities of the PO Valley should be well worth protecting, and, considering their proximity to the Redoubt Center, it is likely that initially at least these sections will constitute part of the area to be defended.

D. SUBSISTENCE.

Food probably will be a critical item on the enemy's supply list. Vast stores of meat and canned foods are reported being cached in caves and subterranean warehouses in the SALZBURG area. The amounts of food required by the forces necessary to defend would be tremendous. The amounts stored are a matter of conjecture, but it must be admitted that the enemy normally manages adequate supply even under unfavorable combat conditions. It is, therefore, logical to assume that his preparations for feeding the Redoubt Center are progressing. This supply certainly will be supplemented by the use of dehydrated foods and by intense cultivation of the small, rich valleys within the Redoubt Center.

It can further be expected that the enemy will attempt to hold, exploit and drain to the fullest the productivity of the PO and DANUBE Valleys, Western CZECHOSLOVAKIA and the Upper BALKANS as long as possible.

E. Enemy Strength and Strategic Reserves for Defense of the Redoubt.

Inasmuch as the actual, tactical defense cannot begin until some undetermined future date the enemy strength cannot be gauged regiment by regiment, nor can units be listed by specific designation. A general estimate, however, indicates that if allowed to withdraw on his own time schedule the enemy can create an elite force, predominately SS and Mountain troops, of between 200,000 and 300,000 men. This veteran force, for defense of the Redoubt Center, would be well-equipped, trained for mountain warfare and thoroughly imbued with the Nazi spirit.

Furthermore, the Wehrmacht shows no signs of quitting and undoubtedly will continue to fight as long as it receives orders, equipment and supplies.

IV. Conclusions.

A. Enemy Capabilities.

It is believed that the enemy possesses the following capabilities:

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1. To withdraw voluntarily and immediately to the Redoubt Center, screening with forces not needed or incapable of being supported at the Center.
2. To delay on successive positions back to the Redoubt Center.
3. To continue defense of the National Redoubt (the area presently occupied by the enemy), give ground or counterattack where necessary, to maintain the integrity of his force, and, when pressed, retire to the Redoubt Center.
4. In combination with any of the above, to make a fanatical "last man" defense at the Redoubt Center.

3. Discussion.

Terrain features in Southern Germany will assist materially in the execution of any one of the above capabilities. The eastern flank could be held in strength along the line VIENNA - JABLUNKA Pass - DRESDEN - ELBE River. The line from VIENNA to JABLUNKA Pass, behind the VAB River defenses to be held determinedly. VIENNA, the main hinge, and the DANUBE Valley to be protected by elements of the Sixth SS Panzer Army reinforced by troops from the BALKANS and ITALY. Under pressure this line would hinge on JABLUNKA Pass and fall back on the defenses of the SUDETEN Mountains and along the ELBE River. Under further pressure the line could then hinge on WARNDORF and run SW along the ERE BOHEMIA Range to SELB and NW along the THURINGIA to EISENACH.

Under additional pressure the line SELB - WARNDORF - JABLUNKA could retire fighting to the SW to a line EISENACH - SELB - VIENNA, there making a determined stand on the Southern BOHEMIAN mountains just north of the DANUBE River. This would allow a considerable shortening of the line and the building up of a small reserve.

The western flank could hinge on the LORRACH - FREIBURG sector, which is presently manned and being fortified to a depth of 30-40 kms. A determined effort could be made to keep the line LORRACH - FREIBURG - KARLSRUHE - FRANKFURT - FULDA - EISENACH intact by holding the high ground east of the RHINE - and diverting Allied drives to the north east so that the tip of this flank still can rest on the MORE MICH when the right flank falls back on the THURINGIA (these ranges meet at EISENACH).

Then drives from this high left flank ground, the line could continue to pivot on LORRACH and follow the SWABIAN Jura range NN from LORRACH to a point north of ULM where it lies only about 25 miles from the FRANCONIAN Jura, which would be utilized by the right flank as a secondary delaying position.

The final stand before the Redoubt Center could lie from LORRACH along the SWABIAN Jura - DANUBE River to Vienna. This is the last natural line of defense before the Redoubt Center itself.

It is believed that the enemy is prepared to follow a plan based generally on the lines described above, but only when forced. It is believed that he realizes that in fighting on two fronts against superior forces, in comparatively flat country without natural defense lines, he must eventually abandon Northern

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Germany and the USSR. He must also realize that the Redoubt Center is the only truly defensible area left to him. Furthermore it lies between the PILSEN - PRAGUE armament industry and the bread basket of the PO Valley. There is no other area which he can defend so profitably. His ability to withdraw and defend successfully would depend generally on his ability to secure the VIENNA - LOBBACH hinges and to maintain a continuous front between them. Particularly, it would depend on his ability to prevent a breakthrough at the base of his operation (i.e. west through the DANUBE Valley toward MUNICH east through KARLSRUHE Gap toward MUNICH).

Capability 3 in conjunction with 4 is believed the capability most likely of adoption for the following reasons:

1. The Nazi elements which control Germany have the will and imperative need to continue to resist.
2. The German Army and people, incapable of disobedience, will follow Nazi orders.
3. The present disposition of both Allied and enemy forces points to the enemy being forced into the Redoubt area.

/s/t/ WILLIAM W. QUINN
Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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**POINT OF DEFENSIVE LINES
TO ACCOMPANY
OF GERMAN
NATIONAL
REDOUT**

**SEVENTH ARMY
5 MARCH 1945**







Canals, etc. in the Netherlands and in the West
by Alpha Editor, etc. in the Netherlands and in the West
John J. Brennan and Charles L. R. 1944
WASHINGTON, JULY 1944

OVERPRINT OF DEFENSIVE LINES TO ACCOMPANY STUDY OF GERMAN NATIONAL REDOUBT

G-2 SEVENTH ARMY
25 MARCH 1945


(The Hague's Grand Canal)



Canals, Mountains, Elevation and Depth, and Port and
other features by Appia E. Haldar, D. S. Jones, J. J. M. Allen, and
John J. Hirsch, and Charles C. Riddiford
WASHINGTON • JULY 1944

PRINT OF DEFENSIVE LINES TO ACCOMPANY STUDY OF GERMAN NATIONAL REDBOUT

G-2 SEVENTH ARMY
25 MARCH 1945
(The Hague's Coast)



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MAJOR POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF GREATER GERMANY

JANUARY 1945

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
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OSTLAND

REICHSKOMMISSARIAT

GERMANIE

GENERAL-GOUVERNEMENT



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 January 1948

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel F. Edward Luxton
 FROM: Roger A. Pfaff, Lt. Col., INF.
 Acting Chief A-2 Branch
 SUBJECT: Report from inside Germany

Mr. Carlson, recently returned from Stockholm, has prepared the following digest report which I thought you would be interested in reading. Undoubtedly, Mr. Carlson and General Magruder would also be interested in reading this memorandum.

However, in view of certain individuals named in said memorandum and our delicate relationships with them, it would not be wise, in our opinion, to disseminate widely this memorandum.

Roger A. Pfaff
 R.A.P.

*This has been disseminated
 to all interested agencies
 J.A.*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, D. C.

TO: Lt. Col. to Gen. Staff
Chief X-2, Rm. 11

FROM: William A. Carlson

SUBJECT: Report from Berlin regarding

On December 20, 1944, I received the following verbal report from Lt. Thorsten Axelsson who is on the Swedish general staff as a combat intelligence officer. Lt. Axelsson had returned on December 20, 1944 from Berlin where he had been as a courier for the Swedish government. His trip took him ten days in all. Before he departed for Berlin he was furnished with several pieces of the message which the Gestapo was taking away from him. Lt. Axelsson protested about this treatment to the Swedish authorities and his return to Stockholm and he was, however, told to stick to the facts taken in Stockholm for German couriers.

1. Minister of Culture, who occupied the post of Cultural Minister in the German government, stated to Lt. Axelsson's contact (whom I believe to be a member of the Swedish Legation, Berlin) that Hitler was thrown thirty meters by the force of the explosion in the way, attempt, Stauffenberg, who was the chief organizer of the attempt was standing by with a pistol to shoot Hitler if the explosion did not kill him. Hitler was knocked unconscious by the explosion and was considered certainly to be dead. Consequently, Stauffenberg did not want to compromise himself either by making a mistake or by making sure. The force of the explosion rendered Hitler unconscious. Up to the time when this information was given to Axelsson (approximately December 20, 1944) Hitler had recovered from his injury in the war, and was able to speak with a very strong voice.

2. Minister of War also made the statement in the same manner as above that Berlin was to be considered under technical

SECRET

arrest since he was under guard at all times. He was allowed to exercise his rights as long as he was in the air. He was allowed to go about visiting the field and second line troops and POWs. His not taking active part in air activities was explained to the ground by pointing out that the ground troops were automatic and he was under the control of the air force, so that Cooper no longer needed to waste his time in the air force. For the first time in years Cooper was allowed to his escape at Karinhall for the Christmas holidays. (He has been contacted from another source in Stockholm, which telephoned to Karinhall.)

3. Lt. Akrell stated that the morale in Germany is much better now than when he last visited Germany in September 1944. Goebbels had been backing up the morale of Germany with an analogy between the German position now as compared with the Russian conditions at Berlin. From the Russian, from the depths of their depression at that time, could come victory from Germany. Now when Germany could the situation and have recovered. The analogy was that has accepted a challenge.

4. Lt. Akrell stated that he likes the idea of the German people not at their feet but getting up, on the front was when he, to fight without any transition to the West from the East and all of Germany.

5. Lt. Akrell met Captain Weissmann of the Luftwaffe on the train between Berlin and Berlin. Captain Weissmann is one of the heroes of the Luftwaffe, having had planes shot down to his credit with 40 POWs. Captain Weissmann claimed that the last record fighter shot was the British Spitfire. The last record were the Russian planes. The Americans were not considered as good pilots as the British. The Airacobra was considered as good at all.

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APPENDIX

The attached document was received from the [redacted] (branch or office) Courier Receipt No. [redacted]

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10-10-68, Courier Receipt No. 681408

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SOURCE: <i>005</i>	ACCESSION NO. <i>DATA</i>
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BRITISH SECURITY CO-ORDINATION

Executive 1001
 MORANT 1246

1100 Connecticut Ave. N. W.
 1444 SIXTYNINTH STREET, N. W.
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

TOP SECRET

1 October 1964, 10:00

have received the following telegram from General
 1001:

1. The following is a copy to the US of the apparent unbreakable code from the Army attributing this
 - a. to fear of consequence of defeat in view of unconditional surrender basis, and
 - b. to Nazi Party discipline.
2. We are asked for outside investigation of methods of breaking down this discipline as SCARF is not only theatre concern.
3. British US have already committee with Bruce Lockhart as Chairman to formulate a plan. Following represented: COE, Foreign Office, Controlling Officer Ministry of Information.
4. SCARF member now also joined committee. Meetings held last Friday and Monday quite abortive as all except SOE and Controlling Officer think all possible in the way of propaganda, etc. already being done. We are not convinced and asked that Committee should be made standing Committee with instructions to make a move on and do something constructive. This request apparently refused and secretary of Committee now drafting report to US with suggested reply for CCIS to send SCARF. We are sending Secretariat a paper containing our views and hope that report may be less discouraging, than seems likely from meeting, however.

	INITIALS
O. C. Deering, Jr.	
J. J. Nezigas	
E. J. Patuell, Jr.	P
R. Thru	
D. C. Lee	
J. W. Auchincloss	
W. B. Kantack	
W. H. Miler	
P. F. Pagliaro	
A. W. Salloway	
<i>W. H. Hane</i>	
J. B. Donovan	
A. W. Asmuth, Jr.	
A. L. Dart	
H. H. Hamilton	
L. R. Howton	
C. S. McClalland	
J. E. McDonnell	
J. R. Schaefer, Jr.	
Secretariat Files	
Director's Files	
O. G. C. Files	

Please send copy
to G. Mann
Outside ant/16. 25P/Relt
card _____ of
the camera field (23695)

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 11, 1945

Dear Ned:

I have given considerable thought to General Donovan's letter of December 11 and the paper enclosed therewith on black propaganda treatment of unconditional surrender. We feel that it is important that no promises or commitments be made to the German people in official statements of this Government and that this is the only position which can properly be taken in the light of this Government's policy. However, if for military purposes connected with the prosecution of the war and our operations against Germany, our Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to have the Office of Strategic Services undertake certain black propaganda programs, this would appear to be a matter for their decision and responsibility. The question is, therefore, presumably one which you would wish to take up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Sincerely yours,

James Clement Dunn
James Clement Dunn

G. Edward Duxton, Esquire,
Assistant Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Twenty-fifth and E Streets,
Washington, D.C.

Copy to [illegible]



attached for your signature
as a letter to Mr. Dunn for-
warding a duplicate set of the
papers previously sent to him
on black propaganda treatment
of unconditional surrender.

C. A. Bane

C. A. Bane

Office of the Secretariat

at 11:00 AM, 11/11/44

100-100000-100000

100-100000-100000

Even 11/11/44

100-100000-100000

SECRET

2 January 1945

The Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dunn:

You will find attached hereto a duplicate set of the papers previously sent to you by General Donovan on the subject of black propaganda treatment of unconditional surrender.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Cheston
Assistant Director

Enclosure

COPY

TO : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. DISCUSSION

1. Analysis of German propaganda for home-front consumption discloses that while a literal translation of the phrase "unconditional surrender" has rarely been employed to convince the German people that there is no alternative but to continue the war, the concept of surrender has become associated in the German mind with the worst catastrophes which could befall the population. The horrible prospects of exile to Siberia, eternal slavery, de-industrialization, break-up of Germany, and even sterilization, have been carefully portrayed to the Germans by their Nazi leaders. It is considered that the German spirit of resistance has been bolstered greatly by fear of the consequence of unconditional surrender.

2. Black propaganda disseminated by wholly secret means and purporting to originate from within enemy countries could:

- a. Diminish the propaganda value of this theme by attempting to dissociate "unconditional surrender" from the afflictions Nazi leaders have been predicting to their people.

Typical Black Theme:

"Unconditional surrender" is demanded of "our" Government by the Allies, but it applies only to the Nazi Government and the Wehrmacht, and not to us as individuals. Behaviour of Allied Forces in Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and occupied areas of Germany disprove the Nazi predictions of horrible conditions resulting from "unconditional surrender."

SECRET

- b. Convert the theme to a black propaganda weapon of our own by associating "unconditional surrender" with desirable rather than fearsome prospects.

Typical Black Theme:

Unconditional surrender means "our" delivery from the Nazi yoke and would represent a new beginning for the German people wherein "our" biological strength, shrewdness, and scientific prowess would soon lead "us" to a healthy economic and social position. Homes, industries, national wealth, and the framework of the German Army would be conserved for the future. The destruction of Germany is too high a price to pay for saving the Nazis for another four or five months, by which time military defeat is inevitable.

- c. Suggest that continuation of the war would expose the German people to a fate worse than that threatened by Nazi propagandists.

Typical Black Theme:

The traditional humanitarian tendencies of the democracies may change to vindictiveness if the war is allowed to continue. The chaos, disease, and privation predicted for us in the event of unconditional surrender will develop by prolonging the war. "Our" continued resistance protects only the Nazi leaders.

- d. Give the German people a vague and wholly spurious idea of the "terms" of unconditional surrender which the Allies will impose.

"Terms" would not be specifically set forth, but "interpreted" in general terms based upon the principles enumerated at TAB 'A'.

3. Methods: At the present time a spurious and purportedly clandestine newspaper, "Das Neue Deutschland," is being printed in Europe by this organization and distributed by means of agents to the German troops on the Western Front and the Italian Front, in Hungary and in Austria. Future editions of this publication, whose cover is still considered to be secure, can develop the themes enumerated in Paragraph 2 above. Rumors currently being carried through neutral countries to Germany and initiated among German troops by means of agents can portray the inevitability of defeat and the reasons for unconditional surrender now. A false document setting forth actual terms of unconditional surrender may be "planted" in such a manner that its content would be appropriately publicized, or the secret Allied intentions after surrender could be "disclosed" by rumor alone.

4. It is recognized that in conducting black propaganda operations, the real source of the propaganda may be suspected, but its dissemination is handled in such a manner that neither the Allied Military Commanders nor their governments can be implicated, and all such propaganda may, if necessary, be officially disavowed.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Morale Operations Branch of this organization be authorized to undertake a black propaganda campaign, directed at the German people's fear of the consequences of "unconditional surrender."

SECRET

2. That themes, similar to those outlined in the foregoing discussion, be employed.

III. CONCURRENCES

Office of War Information
Department of State

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

ALLIED UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF GERMANY**I. TERRITORIAL**

1. Germany will be entirely occupied by Allied troops.
2. Although Russian, British and American troops will occupy three separate sections of Germany, it is not intended to partition the German Reich.

II. MILITARY

1. Internal order will be maintained by Allied forces until a German Government is formed.

III. JUDICIAL

1. War criminals will be tried by special international tribunals. Impartial justice will be meted out.
2. War criminals are defined as leaders of the National Socialist Party, certain general officers in the Wehrmacht, police officers of high rank, and any other persons who have committed criminal acts.
3. Persons accused of being war criminals will be committed to trial only after the establishment of their probable participation in criminal acts by an impartial international body.

IV. POLITICAL

1. Germany will eventually be allowed to choose its own form of government and the Allies will establish the machinery for registering the expression of popular will.
2. The National Socialist Party will be stamped out. No member of that party will be allowed to hold any office or position of trust.

SECRET

3. Germany will be admitted to participation in whatever association of nations is formed after proving its good intentions.

V. ECONOMIC

1. The establishment of a prosperous Germany as a self-sustaining member of the family of nations is desired by the Allies. To this end the Allies will restore the basis of sound German currency, assistance in the restoration of German industry will be provided with a view to absorbing the unemployed, and Germany will be allowed access to raw materials and markets in order to support its industry.
2. Germany will be forbidden to manufacture airplanes, guns over 20 mm. calibre and warships. Allied control will be exercised to insure that German industry will be directed only toward the production of non-military goods.

VI. REPARATIONS

1. Property acquired by Germans in any other country will be returned to its owner or compensation made.
2. Property destroyed or damaged by Germans in any other country will be rebuilt and restored by Germany.

VII. CULTURAL

1. Freedom of religion is guaranteed.
2. Education, speech and the press will be controlled only to the extent necessary to insure that National Socialism and similar doctrines are not advocated.
3. Organizations of a non-military and non-political character will be permitted.

SECRET

11 December 1944

Mr. James C. Dunn, Director
Office of European Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Fannie:

I am inclosing a paper that I am sending
to the Secretary but I would like you to look at it
before it goes in.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Incl.

SECRET

11 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In order to weaken the resistance of the German civilian population, it is proposed to disseminate both by radio and by pamphlet the theme set forth in the enclosed paper entitled "Black Propaganda Treatment of Unconditional Surrender".

I think you understand that this material will be purported to come from within Germany itself and will represent the dissatisfaction of the purported group with the needless sacrifice of continued resistance.

I am anxious to submit this to the Joint Chiefs of Staff but before doing so, I would appreciate your concurrence as to the advisability of the attack and the method proposed.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~
MO

5 December 1944

To: The Director
From: Chief, MO
Re: Your Memorandum 4 December Subject: Black Treatment
of Unconditional Surrender

1. Paragraph 2 (d) has been modified to conform to your suggestion. In explanation of Tab A, it was not intended that it should be circulated in this form but would serve two purposes, namely, (a) a guide to the editorial writers and (b) to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the "line" which it was intended to employ.
2. It is hoped that the rewritten Paragraph 2 (d) satisfactorily conveys this idea.
3. The other matters mentioned in your memorandum are being handled as directed.

K. D. Mann
K. D. Mann, Colonel, AUS
Chief, MO

22

SECRET



file

P
cc

SECRET

4 December 1944

TO: Colonel K. D. Mann

FROM: The Director

I have gone over the plan attached to your letter of December 1, 1944. I think it meets very well the object I had in mind. There are, however, a few comments I would like to make:

Paragraph 2, d.: For the beginning at least I would not have a statement of Allied intentions after unconditional surrender. Because it is a Black Theme, it seems unwise to me to state the terms with such particularity. This is inconsistent with what comes from a German Group within their own country. It could be used to show that it is really something that is coming from us. Therefore the specific should be avoided and Tab I should not be used.

A. There are, however, certain subjects which I believe we should keep in mind -- that it is hopeless to try to convert the real Nazis. Our efforts should be to influence those who are not Nazis and make a drive to reach the particular religious groups among the Lutherans and Catholics. This is so because we are already in contact with both those groups and we should have something said that would express their views.

B. There is a particular batch of letters that I have asked to have obtained for you, written as late as October, between relatives in Holland and Germany. The religious theme is very strong in these letters.

C. We ought to be careful of any inference that we are making. In the current New Yorker is a good story about a spy trial in Rome that illustrates your point and could be circulated clandestinely in Germany.

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

D. In your proposed special broadcast to Western and Southern Germany, I note you desire to stress the Christmas Theme. You should be careful that the mood you express is the mood the people are in. The usual Christmas emotions might not be true for this Christmas. Again as in your immediate paper the religious theme would be more applicable.

E. It has been suggested that something might be played upon Unrra as a means of helping displaced persons.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Major General William J. Donovan

DATE: 6 December 1941

FROM : Army C. Info

E. C. R

SUBJECT:

Attached are a few newsamples of German letters.
Two are written by German civilians to POW's in Canada.
They express the same feelings as the captured mail did.
This is unusual as POW mail used to be strictly censored.

CONFIDENTIAL

ARMY II

HERMANN HETLENRODAR

210 LIEBHARDSTR.

GRINSHAM 57 GROSS TELAR

HESSEN

GERMANY.

GEN.

100 001 001 001 001

100 001 001 001 001

R.

22-9-44

GRINSHAM 57 GROSS TELAR

100 001 001 001 001

CIVILIAN MORAL

IRB(M).

LON 123.(M)

LON 115 8

N.D. M.I. 7

N.D. D.M.I.

U.S.A.N.B.

- 1 INF
- 1 USDR(M)
- 1 ST.FILE

OP/KE

NOV. 21

D.M.I.

C.M.I.

S.M.I.

3-015

8

My wife and I are very grateful. We do not know what the next hour will bring to us. It is good that we do not know everything. That we live from one day to the next and that our death hour arrives when GOD'S will is everything in GOD'S hand. When our end has come in this world and maybe it will be after in the second world. Everything is the same here. GOD'S still hasn't written. I have no more hope about him, but one is not to give up hope right away. I always get excited as soon as we are all together. I keep my ears shut so that I won't hear anything but one sees the faces. The best thing is to shut my eyes too. If only there were an end to it. Will this always continue. I have so much work. I don't know where to begin. The harvest is ready. You know what that means - every day into the field and the work at home on. It is no longer given to live. My dear husband, you think I might have other thoughts or talk in private to you, but one does not think of that; we think shall we still be alive in the morning? We will keep the firm belief in our hearts that we shall meet again in good health, even if everything is lost, but we shall still have our lives."

EXAMINER'S NOTE:

Correspondent was recorded on 4-4-43 as being discouraged by the WAR.

CONFIDENTIAL

BYRON PRIDE,
Director

S
P/W
ARMY 3

P/W CAN 43362/44

FRANZ ANNA SCHMITT
OBERS-HILBERSHEIM
GERMANY

GEFR. WALTER SCHMITT
M.S. 10162
CAMP 133
CAN.

R

RO-8-4404E-ALGERIA (KR. BINGEN)

21-8-44

520

CP

14-11-44 15-11-44 GERMAN

LOW. AIS 8
W.D. (M)
IRB (M)
LOW. (D.O.) (M)

1 INV
1 USDR (M)
1 SPA. FILE

EJT/XM
NOV. 20

YB
11-25

0-10
5-11

3-156

(8)

INDICATION OF CIVILIAN KOPALE-SUICIDE REPORTED

P/W's mother writes: "FRITZ (1) is in RUSSIA, and HEINRICH (1) in FRANCE. WILLI (1) has not written since 7-7. And even now, everyone has to go. Even JAKOB CUTTENBERG has to leave now. HEINRICH SCHMUCK (4) was killed too. Who knows who will ever be returning home. Let us hope for the best, and for a speedy end to the war. This is the wish of everyone. There is again a great abundance of fruit and grapes, and and there is no one here. (2) Many old people here have died. SCHMUCK (3) in the PFARRGASSE hanged himself. MARIA BOHN'S father is also ill."

(1) writer's 2 sons and a son-in-law.

(2) Meaning there is no one left to harvest them.

(3) No more information is known about this man. Nor is it known whether the HEINRICH SCHMUCK (4) who was killed in action was a relative of this man.

EX. 1. NOTES:

Writer has been very war-weary for a long, long time.

CONFIDENTIAL

BYRON PRIOR,
Director.

CL.
74-11-1944

1 Nov: 1944

WELLO - EGYPTIAN CENSORSHIP.

Type of mail: private letter, dated 26.8.44

Date: 1st Nov: 1944
Ref: NGX/GNR/50843/44

Enclosures: 1 photo.

Enclosure
Language: German

From:

Heli MIKITAUS,
Hindenburgstr. 4,
Halle/Sa. - Sa./GERMANY.

To:

Obergefr: HERBERT MIETHUS,
Postpost No: 10638 No

Distribution:

Foreign: P. & T. Censorship, London
D.N.W.

Local: C.R.I.M.E. U.S. Theater
Censor.
R.A.F. (Int.) Censorship
G.S.I. 12. G.S.I. 14.

Disposal: Confirmed.

Subject:

File No: CM.G/R.3/166

RHODES CAPTURED MAIL No. 1.

WELLO - - Air-Mail on DRESDEN-PRITAL.

My dearest,

"We have had no rain since weeks already but always sunshine. Everything is dry in the garden and everything is getting yellow; but nothing to do, the Lord gives us the t we deserve, I am sure of that. To have actually 40° in the shade.

Perhaps you have heard already of the attack on Dresden-Prital. When the alert was sounded I was at the sun-bath (1) and from there we could watch everything. There were many enemy formations, about 70 to 100 "planes flew over the sun-bath on their way to Dresden. The alarm lasted for 2 hours and it was very dangerous; it was the first time I saw one. Dearest, let us hope we will never be separated from each other. Even if we would have to lose our home, let us hope we won't be separated. But everything depends on the Lord, we can do nothing but trust in him. Prital, it looks bad in Prital, there are presumed to be 450-500 killed, many children. . . I have got now a notice from the Labour Office that I had to report for work; I wonder what I will have to do. I have put down on it my wish, and also everything else, also concerning my health, etc. . . I insist upon homework. . . HANCOCK has come back from Rhodes to Hamburg. . . Mr. ZUMPE has been sent on service to 1st near Konigsberg on the Masurian Lakes 35 kilo- metres from the front. . .

"Today again I received a notice to be ready for the Weihnachts. Well dear, a complete mobilization everywhere. We are in danger as well as you are. Let us hope everything will be all right. . .

WELLO (1) in German: "Let's hold"

Letter bears no trace of censorship

Ref: NGX/GNR/50843/44

(Signed)

(Chief Distribution Officer)

NGX/126

Submitted to:

R.F.
H.E.W.
D.R.W.

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM PRITH.

COPY.

G.M. 12.11.44.

CONFIDENTIAL

REF: EGY/GRY/ 50825/44.

DATE: 31st October, 1944.

JABLO - HUNGARIAN CENSORSHIP

TYPE OF MAIL: PRIVATE LETTER. DATED: 31.8.44. LANGUAGE: GERMAN.

FROM: JOSEF GIGL
AMSTERDAM

TO: JOSEF GIGL

. NO. 10638 D.

POST BILLING
MUNICH 2, LAND.PREVIOUS REFERENCES, if relevant
HEX/GRY/ 50795/44.
(File No. CH.G/R.3/117)
of 19.10.44.Submitted to:- H.E.W.
H/FOOD.
H/T.
D.R.W.

File No. CH.G/R.3/145.

EXCISE CAPTURED MAIL NO. 3.

DOWNTOWN, NOBLE BAD HARVEST MOBILISATION.

EXTRACT:-

The last mail of HAREL was written on 30.7, and since then we are without news and we are really worried, because it seems to be so terrible in France. Nevertheless let's hope for the best and have faith in God. VALENTIN does not like Wilhelmshafen as much as Holland. Leave has been stopped for a long time and one only sees soldiers from hospital and those who are working in the Reich and profiteers. Now and then there is again a mobilisation of young and old, as is necessary. Everybody supposes that it cannot go on much longer, as it is, and that there will soon be an end. But one has been thinking that for a long time and it gets worse though at present we have a rest from the planes. But who knows for how long.

We have harvested the corn except the summer-corn. But there is not much grain this year, neither straw nor corn and we ought to be glad if we get so much together that it is enough for us. But now shall we manage with the contribution. We have to deliver 16 hundredweight of hay. We do not know yet about the corn. Well, one has to take it as it comes and if the Lord gives us one more year to live, then he will also care for our food....

CONFIDENTIAL

BYRON PRICE
Dated.

REF.: EGY/GRN/ 50825/44.

- 2 -

KRAUER got a Russian to work for him from MUHLER in Onbek
and the Frenchman went to MUHLER.

WILHEITTE bought himself a little son to his three daughters,
so that he is not placed on the reserved list for nothing.

Your worried parents."

NOTE:- The last sentence is equally obscure in the original.
Letter bears no trace of censorship.

JW/LM.

(Sgd.) J.H. WHITEHEAD Major,
Chief Distribution Officer.

RECOMMENDATION: FOREIGN. P. & T. CENSORSHIP, LONDON.
(D.R.W.)

LOCAL. G.S.I.12.
G.S.I.14.
G.H.I.M.R.
U.S. THEATER CENSOR.

DISPOSAL: CENSORED.

This document contains information that is extremely confidential in character and its disclosure to unauthorized persons would be injurious to the national defense. It is to be controlled and its distribution limited to authorized personnel only. It is to be destroyed when it is no longer needed for official use. It is to be handled in accordance with the instructions of the Director of Censorship.

CONFIDENTIAL

BYRON P. P.
Director

COPY.
G.H. 12.11.44.

CONFIDENTIAL

REF.: HY/GRS/ 50833/44.
DATE: 31st October, 1944.

MEMO - EGYPTIAN CENSORSHIP

TYPE OF MAIL: PRIVATE LETTER. DATED: 6.9.44. LANGUAGE: GERMAN.

FROM: H. JESCHKE

TO: CENSORSHIP
MIRIAM JESCHKE

RAFFLES
RAFFLES STR. 15.

P.P. NO 10638 D.

Submitted to:- R.G.
P.I.D.
B.B.C.
C.M.
D.R.W.

SUBJECT.

RECEIVED CENSORSHIP MAIL NO. 1.

File No. G.H.G/R.3/151.

Subject -- Shortage of food.

My dear Miriam,

I am so afraid for you, for you are so much in danger. Just now I heard in the "Volkszeitung" that in the Aegean Sea, 88 motor-sailing-boats have been destroyed. Surely there have been attacking you. Only we don't understand, why you do not move from there. The whole Balkans is now a theatre of secondary importance. France is also as good as finished and the enemy is coming nearer. To-day I am longing so much for you, my Miriam, one could do nothing but weep the whole time. And when shall we see each other again? My dear Miriam, I think it won't last much longer...

One hardly finds anything to buy here, for two men are running after those things... (d) "London."

Love letters have no trace of censorship.

JH/CL

(Sgt.) J.H. WHITEHEAD MAJOR,
CHIEF DISTRIBUTION OFFICER.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORWARDED. P. A. T. WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON.
(D.R.W.)

LOCAL.

G.H. 1.11.44.
P.S. THOMAS (MIRIAM)
R.A.P. (INT.) CENSORSHIP.
B.O.I. (L. M.M. (THROUGH N.A.)).
G.H. 1.12.
G.H. 1.14.

RECEIVED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BYRON FRICK,
Director

S

P/W
ARMY
SECTION II

P/A CAN. 43539/44

ANRI GÖRTZ
22/GERDERHAHN
S/ERKELENZ HILD.
GERMANY.

O'GLENH,
KARL GÖRTZ
N.S. 36461
CALR 133
CANADA.

R

24.9.44

27.9.44

93

JS

15.11.44

16.11.44 GERMAN

IRB (N)
LX... (DOIM)
N.S. (DRI)
N.D. 11-7
USA (D)

CIVILIAN L. RALE

P/'s wife writes: If one only knew what to do
nothing would matter, were we only happily together.
It is sad that people can murder and harm each other
for 5 years at a stretch. This cannot be looked
upon as human anymore. One often thinks it would
have been better not to have been born. It is a
good thing that civilisation notices nothing of it
yet. Yes, A.L., I hope once more a happy time will
come when we can be happily together. If
such were not the case I would like to die with
you, J.O. and (1)
But with keep your chin up, and we will hope for
the best until the hour of reunion comes. I always
and everything must come and bring us to you

1 INF
1 HD(ARMY)
1 USON(M)
3 FILES

MEM/EA
NOV. 21

16
14/5
17-5
12-8

P/'s son

CONFIDENTIAL

BYRON PRIOR
Director

HYRON PRIGER,
Director

E.R.

20.11.44.

CONFIDENTIAL

MAIL-BOX-111 N. ST. LOUIS, MO.

Type of Mail: Letter.

Date: 17th November, 1944.

Dated: 3.9.44.

Ref. EGY/GRE/50976/44.

Post Date: 4.9.44.

Language: German.

From: Mrs. A. "MECHAUER",
10 Gessende /
Dresden
Kunzengasse, 3.

To: Oberst Arno "SCHUBERT",
Feldpost No. 10630 D.

Disposal: Condemned.

Submitted To: D.R.M.
H/O.
H.E.M.

File No. DM.5/B.3/296.

DISTRIBUTION
FOREIGN P & T Censorship London
(D.R.M.)
LOCAL H.M.F. (Int) Censorship
G.S.I. 12.
G.S.I. 14.
G.R.I.M.E.
U.S. Theater Censor.

SUBJECT: RHODES CAPTURED MAIL NO. 3.

-EFFECTS OF BOMBING
-LEAFLETS ON GERMANY
-AIR-RAID MORALE.

Extracts:

"My dear good love,

GRITTEL told me about the attack on Freital, they all trembled pretty badly.

.....Just when she was standing in the corridor...the "Fisk", all eight, started to go into action. All the houses were shaking and the doors and windows were clattering. GRITTEL quickly opened all windows and when she wanted to open the window in one room, she covered her face with both hands and cried: "Mother! Our beautiful Dresden is burning"; but it was not exactly in Dresden. They started with Kerschütz, and Burglitz has been hit very badly. GRITTEL saw the first bombs fall and after that only the terrific smashes of the other bombs.

.....Then the planes met in one group and in a compact body they came over Freital from two sides. The children collected the leaflets with baskets. GRITTEL said that we could expect them that week; we are living in great anxiety now that they are attacking Dresden. That's how it is with me. I live from day to day. On the other, I can't care any more, it does not help you, we cannot escape our destiny. Let us only hope for the best."

(s) "Lucky".

NOTE: Letter bears no trace of censorship.

"TITTELHARD, MAJOR.
CHIEF DISTRIBUTION OFFICER.

DM/77.

CONFIDENTIAL

BYRON PUGH,
Editor

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Type of Mail,
Private letter

REF: RNY/GRB/50915/44

DATE: 4.9.44

LANGUAGE: German

FROM:

TH:

H. PINTSCHKE
Str. der S. 4. 5
LONDON W/ PinnerWalter PINTSCHKE
P.P. No. 10638 D.

PREVIOUS REFERENCES, if relevant

DISTRIBUTION.

RNY/GRB/50915/44
(File No. GR.G/R. 3/240) of 4.11.44.POSITION: F & T CENSORSHIP, LONDON
(D.R.W.)RNY/GRB/50915/44
(File No. GR.G/R. 3/240) of 6.11.44.LOCAL: G.R.I.M.S.
G.S.I. 12
G.S.I. 14

SUBMITTED TO:

U.S. Theater Censor

HMA
D.S.V.
R/G

File No.

GR.G/R. 3/299

RECEIVED

Continued

SECRET

BOOKS CAPTURED MAIL No. 1.GERMANY - RUSSIA

"Dear Father,

We are very glad to have received a letter from you at last. It arrived today and it is dated 16.8. So now it is official that you are on 8, unfortunately the letter before this one was lost. But one can understand that you are in another corner now...

Dear FATHER, it will be bad if mail from there should be so slow, because everything is going so wrong. Yesterday the news of Finland, in France they are already at BREST. It is bad if one doesn't know beforehand what will happen and what we will have to go through. Dear FATHER you will hardly believe it if I will tell you that this year we did not have time for glancing, but I hope that even as it is we will have enough food for the chickens....

Dear FATHER, GERTHON Pyta was also killed at the front, also one from Modakow who was living with the MATHS, I cannot recall his name. LONCH who is called STRECHER is also away, he was sent somewhere for the Party. Hans KEISER is also a soldier now... Is you eat goats, and do you have also potatoes? Here the soldiers have them each day! During the day the children go to peel them and in the evenings the young girls go to do it. We have enough peelings now for the rabbits, LISA always brings a basket home.

It is going to be bad for the youth. It can already be seen in LIRA who has lost out of complaints. It can already be seen in LIRA who has lost out of complaints. It can already be seen in LIRA who has lost out of complaints.

NOTE: PRISON letters to the same addresses were reported under RNY/GRB/50915/44. Letter bears no trace of censorship.

(sgd.) E. Whitehead Major
Chief Distribution Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

BYRON PRIOR
Director

General:

I shall go over the captured uncensored German letters written in September and October to and from Holland. I read them by the hundreds last week and I have never been so impressed by anything coming out of Germany since the war. Signs of bad morale, of exactly what they are most afraid of are ample. They also express time and time again, that at least what they have still got is each other or life. That and the fear of Russia were the two outstanding themes. There is so much of it, which we could use and use in their own way of expressing it, I would think that if we say what they say themselves we could break morale a lot faster than by inventing stuff.

We must be careful with promises. We can not say clandestinely that we will see that German currency remains stable, when at the same time we set a very low rate for the Mark.

A lot less publicity should be given to the rules imposed upon the soldiers concerning fraternization with the Germans. That \$.60.- fine should not be played up. Let them at least hope for the best from us, they way they are inclined to think.

In the current New Yorker is a good story about a spy trial in Rome. It is a story of utter American fairness, very moving. I would circulate that story clandestinely in Germany with the date and place of publication, but make it look, as if it had been picked up by a German resistance group.

I shall send you a representative sample of the above mentioned letters as soon as I get back to N.Y.

The atmosphere in Germany now is very stern and determined. I doubt that this year they take out much time and emotion for Christmas. It is true that usually this event played a large part in very Germans life. It was of a sentimental nature. But this year they cannot afford it. If in these broadcasts the mood is too different from the way they feel, it will make them furious. The purely religious theme seems to me the most advisable. Even in our spoken ~~Nazi~~ letters religion is creeping in as the last hope. I would play up the two opposites, war means more loss, more deaths, stopping of war means - life. We must stick to their own mood, but make it more so. We have no chance to convert the real Nazis, so lets try to influence the weak, the hopeless ones, the widows, the orphans.

The big problem in Germany is "displaced persons". No doubt that we will have to help them in that matter. We could launch a rumor, that Unrra is going to help the Germans with that problem (by the way I am sure that it will be so) and then they might attach more hope to this and hope that we will also help them in welfare or what not.

1 December 1944

To: The Director
Via: Deputy Director, SAC *X*
From: Chief, MO

1. Pursuant to your request, we have drawn up for your signature a proposed recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject of "Black Propaganda Treatment of Unconditional Surrender Theme."

2. This paper was submitted to Mr. Elmer Davis personally on this date, and he concurs in the desirability of undertaking the program and the themes to be utilized. Of course he does not wish to comment on the methods to be employed, as he feels he has no competence in this phase of our operation.

3. It is understood that your office desired to handle the coordination with the Department of State.

K. D. Mann

K. D. Mann, Col., AUS
Chief, MO

SECRET

SUBJECT: BLACK PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER
 TO : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I. DISCUSSION

1. Analysis of German propaganda for home-front consumption discloses that while a literal translation of the phrase "unconditional surrender" has rarely been employed to convince the German people that there is no alternative but to continue the war, the concept of surrender has become associated in the German mind with the worst catastrophes which could befall the population. The horrible prospects of exile to Siberia, eternal slavery, de-industrialization, break-up of Germany, and even sterilization, have been carefully portrayed to the Germans by their Nazi leaders. It is considered that the German spirit of resistance has been bolstered greatly by fear of the consequences of unconditional surrender.

2. Black propaganda disseminated by wholly secret means and purporting to originate from within enemy countries could:

- a. Diminish the propaganda value of this theme by attempting to dissociate "unconditional surrender" from the afflictions Nazi leaders have been predicting to their people.

Typical Black Themes:

"Unconditional surrender" is demanded of "our" Government by the Allies, but it applies only to the Nazi Government and the Wehrmacht, and not to us as individuals. Behaviour of Allied Forces in Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and occupied areas of Germany disprove the Nazi predictions of horrible conditions resulting from "unconditional surrender."

SECRET

- b. Convert the theme to a black propaganda weapon of our own by associating "unconditional surrender" with desirable rather than fearsome prospects.

Typical Black Theme:

Unconditional surrender means "our" delivery from the Nazi yoke and would represent a new beginning for the German people wherein "our" biological strength, shrewdness, and scientific prowess would soon lead "us" to a healthy economic and social position. Homes, industries, national wealth, and the framework of the German Army would be conserved for the future. The destruction of Germany is too high a price to pay for saving the Nazis for another four or five months, by which time military defeat is inevitable.

- c. Suggest that continuation of the war would expose the German people to a fate worse than that threatened by Nazi propagandists.

Typical Black Theme

The traditional humanitarian tendencies of the democracies may change to vindictiveness if the war is allowed to continue. The chaos, disease, and privation predicted for us in the event of unconditional surrender will develop by prolonging the war. "Our" continued resistance protects only the Nazi leaders.

- d. Give the German people a clear (but wholly spurious) idea of specific terms of unconditional surrender (i.e., "Allied Terms").

Typical Black Theme:

As set forth at Tab A.

SECRET

purportedly clandestine newspaper, "Das Neue Deutschland," is being printed in Europe by this organization and distributed by means of agents to the German troops on the Western Front and the Italian Front, in Hungary and in Austria. Future editions of this publication, whose cover is still considered to be secure, can develop the themes enumerated in Paragraph 2 above. Rumors currently being carried through neutral countries to Germany and initiated among German troops by means of agents can portray the inevitability of defeat and the reasons for unconditional surrender now. A false document setting forth actual terms of unconditional surrender may be "planted" in such a manner that its content would be appropriately publicized, or the secret Allied intentions after surrender could be "disclosed" by rumor alone.

4. It is recognized that in conducting black propaganda operations, the real source of the propaganda may be suspected, but its dissemination is handled in such a manner that neither the Allied Military Commanders nor their Governments can be implicated, and all such propaganda may, if necessary, be officially disavowed.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Morale Operations Branch of this organization be authorized to undertake a black propaganda campaign, directed at the German people's fear of the consequences of "unconditional surrender."

2. That themes, similar to those outlined in the foregoing discussion, be employed.

III. CONCURRENCES

Office of War Information
Department of State

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

ALLIED INTENTIONS
AFTER UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF GERMANY

A.

I. TERRITORIAL

1. Germany will be entirely occupied by Allied troops.
2. Although Russian, British and American troops will occupy three separate sections of Germany, it is not intended to partition the German Reich.

II. MILITARY

1. Internal order will be maintained by Allied forces until a German Government is formed.

III. JUDICIAL

1. War criminals will be tried by special international tribunals. Impartial justice will be meted out.
2. War criminals are defined as leaders of the National Socialist Party, certain general officers in the Wehrmacht, police officers of high rank, and any other persons who have committed criminal acts.
3. Persons accused of being war criminals will be committed to trial only after the establishment of their probable participation in criminal acts by an impartial international body.

IV. POLITICAL

1. Germany will eventually be allowed to choose its own form of government and the Allies will establish the machinery for registering the expression of popular will.

SECRET

2. The National Socialist Party will be banned.

No member of that party will be allowed to hold any office or position of trust.

3. Germany will be admitted to participation in whatever association of nations is formed after proving its good intentions.

V. ECONOMIC

1. The establishment of a prosperous Germany as a self-sustaining member of the family of nations is desired by the Allies. To this end the Allies will restore the basis of sound German currency, assistance in the restoration of German industry will be provided with a view to absorbing the unemployed, and Germany will be allowed access to raw materials and markets in order to support its industry.
2. Germany will be forbidden to manufacture airplanes, guns over 20 mm. calibre and warships. Allied control will be exercised to insure that German industry will be directed only toward the production of non-military goods.

VI. REPARATIONS

1. Property acquired by Germans in any other country will be returned to its owner or compensation made.
2. Property destroyed or damaged by Germans in any other country will be rebuilt and restored by Germany.

VII. CULTURAL

1. Freedom of religion is guaranteed.
2. Education, speech and the press will be controlled only to the extent necessary to insure that National

SECRET

Socialism and similar doctrines are not advocated.

3. Organizations of a non-military and non-political character will be permitted.

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: BLACK PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER
 TO : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I. DISCUSSION

1. Analysis of German propaganda for home-front consumption discloses that while a literal translation of the phrase "unconditional surrender" has rarely been employed to convince the German people that there is no alternative but to continue the war, the concept of surrender has become associated in the German mind with the worst catastrophes which could befall the population. The horrible prospects of exile to Siberia, eternal slavery, de-industrialization, break-up of Germany, and even sterilization, have been carefully portrayed to the Germans by their Nazi leaders. It is considered that the German spirit of resistance has been bolstered greatly by fear of the consequences of unconditional surrender.

2. Black propaganda disseminated by wholly secret means and purporting to originate from within enemy countries could:

- a. Diminish the propaganda value of this theme by attempting to dissociate "unconditional surrender" from the afflictions Nazi leaders have been predicting to their people.

Typical Black Theme:

"Unconditional surrender" is demanded of "our" Government by the Allies, but it applies only to the Nazi Government and the Wehrmacht, and not to us as individuals. Behaviour of Allied Forces in Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and occupied areas of Germany disprove the Nazi predictions of horrible conditions resulting from "unconditional surrender."

SECRET

- b. Convert the theme to a black propaganda weapon of our own by associating "unconditional surrender" with desirable rather than fearsome prospects.

Typical Black Theme:

Unconditional surrender means "our" delivery from the Nazi yoke and would represent a new beginning for the German people wherein "our" biological strength, shrewdness, and scientific prowess would soon lead "us" to a healthy economic and social position. Homes, industries, national wealth, and the framework of the German Army would be conserved for the future. The destruction of Germany is too high a price to pay for saving the Nazis for another four or five months, by which time military defeat is inevitable.

- c. Suggest that continuation of the war would expose the German people to a fate worse than that threatened by Nazi propagandists.

Typical Black Theme:

The traditional humanitarian tendencies of the democracies may change to vindictiveness if the war is allowed to continue. The chaos, disease, and privation predicted for us in the event of unconditional surrender will develop by prolonging the war. "Our" continued resistance protects only the Nazi leaders.

- d. Give the German people a clear (but wholly spurious) idea of specific terms of unconditional surrender (i.e., "Allied Terms").

Typical Black Theme:

As set forth at Tab A.

SECRET

3. Methods: At the present time a spurious and purportedly clandestine newspaper, "Das Neue Deutschland," is being printed in Europe by this organization and distributed by means of agents to the German troops on the Western Front and the Italian Front, in Hungary and in Austria. Future editions of this publication, whose cover is still considered to be secure, can develop the themes enumerated in Paragraph 2 above. Rumors currently being carried through neutral countries to Germany and initiated among German troops by means of agents can portray the inevitability of defeat and the reasons for unconditional surrender now. A false document setting forth actual terms of unconditional surrender may be "planted" in such a manner that its content would be appropriately publicized, or the secret Allied intentions after surrender could be "disclosed" by rumor alone.

4. It is recognized that in conducting black propaganda operations, the real source of the propaganda may be suspected, but its dissemination is handled in such a manner that neither the Allied Military Commanders nor their Governments can be implicated, and all such propaganda may, if necessary, be officially disavowed.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Morale Operations Branch of this organization be authorized to undertake a black propaganda campaign, directed at the German people's fear of the consequences of "unconditional surrender."

2. That themes, similar to those outlined in the foregoing discussion, be employed.

III. CONCLUSION

Office of War Information
Department of State

SECRET

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

SUGGESTED BLACK STATEMENT OF ALLIED INTENTIONS
UPON UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF GERMANY

A.

I. TERRITORIAL

1. Germany will be entirely occupied by Allied troops.
2. Although Russian, British and American troops will occupy three separate sections of Germany, it is not intended to partition the German Reich.

II. MILITARY

1. Internal order will be maintained by Allied forces until a German Government is formed.

III. JUDICIAL

1. War criminals will be tried by special international tribunals. Impartial justice will be noted out.
2. War criminals are defined as leaders of the National Socialist Party, certain general officers in the Wehrmacht, police officers of high rank, and any other persons who have committed criminal acts.
3. Persons accused of being war criminals will be committed to trial only after the establishment of their probable participation in criminal acts by an impartial international body.

IV. POLITICAL

1. Germany will eventually be allowed to choose its own form of government and the Allies will establish the machinery for registering the expression of popular will.

SECRET

2. The National Socialist Party will be stamped out.

No member of that party will be allowed to hold any office or position of trust.

3. Germany will be admitted to participation in whatever association of nations is formed after proving its good intentions.

V. ECONOMIC

1. The establishment of a prosperous Germany as a self-sustaining member of the family of nations is desired by the Allies. To this end the Allies will restore the basis of sound German currency, assistance in the restoration of German industry will be provided with a view to absorbing the unemployed, and Germany will be allowed access to raw materials and markets in order to support its industry.
2. Germany will be forbidden to manufacture airplanes, guns over 80 mm. calibre and warships. Allied control will be exercised to insure that German industry will be directed only toward the production of non-military goods.

VI. REPARATIONS

1. Property acquired by Germans in any other country will be returned to its owner or compensation made.
2. Property destroyed or damaged by Germans in any other country will be rebuilt and restored by Germany.

VII. CIVILIAN

1. Freedom of religion is guaranteed.
2. Education, speech and the press will be controlled only to the extent necessary to insure that National

SECRET

Socialism and similar doctrines are not
advocated.

3. Organizations of a non-military and non-
political character will be permitted.

SECRET

Lt. Bane

1 December 1944

Executive Office

Will you please see that copies of this are made available to SI and X-3 and send the attached back to RMA for accessioning in CID. You might wish to have Mr. Murphy and Mr. Shepardon look at this prior to photostating to see whether they want copies of the whole document or only of portions.

Robert Thrun

Record on the Organized
 to Graham Wilson
 (Sent to Bureau)

Copy Page the Handbook Pattern
 to the Bureau, Bureau of the Bureau
 to the Bureau of the Bureau
 to the Bureau of the Bureau

1 December 1944

Dr. Michael Potulicki
c/o 2640 - 16th St., NW
Washington, 9, D. C.

My dear Dr. Potulicki:

I have received your report. I found it an interesting document.

At my request six experts looked it over. They have told me that the mass of material accumulated by you to demonstrate your point is extremely complete. Thus your wish for my opinion as to whether it could be made still more so leaves little room for comment.

The report is very helpful. I am grateful to you for letting me have it.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

CONFIDENTIAL


OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan
FROM: William L. Langer
SUBJECT:

DATE: 20 November 1944

I am sending you herewith some comments prepared by the R&A staff on the Polish study of the organization of German thinking. If possible, we should like to have this study for accessioning in the Central Information Division.


William L. Langer
Chief, Research and
Analysis Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Lt. Scherake

DATE: 18 November 1944

FROM : Henry Kellerman *K**End.*

SUBJECT: Study on the organization of German thinking

The study proposes to attack pan-Germanism as one of the major causes of past and possibly future wars. The author believes that pan-Germanism has been perpetuated through a network of semi-military, political, cultural, scientific, commercial and propaganda agencies. Public ignorance of these institutions and negligence towards their activity are held largely responsible for the revival of German militarism. The author concludes that the removal of these sources of spiritual rearmament will go a long way toward eliminating the cause of international insecurity and conflict.

The premise undoubtedly is sound. Moreover, the mass of material accumulated by the author to prove his point is astounding. However, the report suffers greatly from poor organization, lack of analysis, and failure to distinguish clearly between indigenous Nazi institutions and others misused by the Nazi for political purposes.

For instance, the author lists the famous Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft founded in 1911, a research institute of world-wide fame, alongside such specific Nazi agencies as the Reichsforschungsrat, founded in 1937, or the Akademie des Deutschen Reiches (see pages 28 and ff.) On the other hand, the highly suspect Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Geopolitik is missing, and the very elaborate organization of German propaganda, especially the radio services, are treated rather inadequately. The brief survey of the National Socialist Party is much too sketchy to be helpful and could easily be spared altogether.

Apparently, the author did not wish to burden the report with analytical comment. Consequently, his descriptive material consists of and large of quotations from books, newspapers and magazine articles, strung loosely together without any attempt to evaluate the reliability of the source used. Some of the information is out-dated, but it is primarily the lack of organization under specific headings and the indiscriminate use of motley sources which confuses the reader. The author apologizes for frequent over-lappings with the explanation that it is often difficult to distinguish between institutions serving scientific and those serving propaganda purposes.

Still, some of the material is quite engrossing and helpful; particularly the chapter on Germanism Abroad (see pages 136 and ff.) contains a wealth of data about agencies and personalities which might be interesting to SI or X-2.

CONFIDENTIAL

Wichita, Kansas

Count. Richard Poluliska, L.I.G.

with Count Teferos

Outside Edges of green
cord indicate the edges of
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is $\frac{1}{25}$ @ f.6.3

Washington 9, D. C.

November 1st, 1944.

Personal and Confidential

My dear General,

Referring to our talk yesterday at the Zamoysskis, I have pleasure in sending you copy of a report which I submitted to the Department of State relative to the various institutions which have a strong grip on German public opinion in Germany and in German circles abroad, the guiding spirit of which is the German General Staff.

I am attaching to my letter a short introduction which at the same time gives the conclusions.

If an alphabetical list of the names quoted in this report were made, one would automatically obtain the list of the leading intellectuals who have worked in the last years in Germany under the direct leadership or with the assistance of military men such as General Ewald von Massow, General Haushofer, General von Epp, SS. General Lorenz, General Becker, General Faupel, Admiral von Trotha, and many others.

The Nazi Party has undoubtedly absorbed many of the organizations which had existed during the Imperial and the Weimar régime. Now, when the N.S.D.A.P. cracks, there will very probably be a tendency of decentralizing the movement, i.e. of returning to the organizations which were in existence before Hitler. That is why it is important to know them.

It must be added that the attached study does not cover the field of the numerous patriotic, Fehme - and other organizations which appeared in the Reich after the last war (like the "Wehrwolf", "Baltikum", "Oberland", "Orgesch" etc.); it deals only with the main scientific and propaganda institutions in Germany.

As this report took a long time to be prepared on the basis of German material which had to be translated, I would be most grateful to have your kind opinion on the question whether it would seem useful to have it made still more complete.

With kindest regards

I am, my dear General

Yours sincerely

M. Stueck

Introduction

The reformation of the German mentality constitutes, doubtlessly, a crucial problem of the present world. For centuries Germanism has fought a tradition which it has endeavored to destroy for its own gains against every possibility of peaceful international cooperation. Consequently, "the pan-Germanic spirit" is being discussed in wide circles. But, up to the present time no attempt has been made to analyze more closely the sources from which it emanates. Thus, the question runs: what actually are the channels through which the German Reich has fostered the pan-German spirit for its external policy which is a policy of penetration, of expansionism and of disruption of other States?

Apart from that, public opinion is highly interested today in the problem of the necessity of re-educating the German people after this war, in order that their pan-German and militaristic mentality should be made to disappear. These two problems are closely linked. For a re-education of Germany cannot even be thought of, without a profound knowledge of that nation.

The Treaty of Versailles made a timid attempt in its Article 176 (3) and 177 to solve this problem:

Art. 176 al. 3

"Consequently, and during the period fixed above, all military academies or similar institutions in Germany, as well as the different military schools for officers, student officers (Aspiranten), cadets, non-commissioned officers or student non-commissioned officers (Aspiranten), other than the schools above for, will be abolished."

Art. 177

"Educational establishments, the universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs and, generally speaking, associations of every description,

themselves with any military matters.

In particular they will be forbidden to instruct or exercise their members, or to allow them to be instructed or exercised, in the profession or use of arms.

These societies, associations, educational establishments and universities must have no connection with the Ministries of war or any other military authority."

That means (a) that it was desired to suppress all military academies or "similar" institutions and (b) that it was forbidden to educational establishments and associations of every kind in Germany to "occupy themselves" in general with military problems.

But the Germans defied this prohibition. Immediately after the Treaty came into force they founded in Berlin a "Heeresbibliothek" (Army Library) which became the center around which henceforth gathered the military brains, such as Groener, von Seeckt, von Hammerstein-Equord, Guderian, Stuelpnagel and hundreds of others. In the "Deutsches Museum" in Munich, Karl Haushofer from the year 1924 began to try out his theory of "geo-politics." Apart from that, between 1920 and 1924 German educational circles devoted themselves entirely to proving Germany's innocence in connection with the origins of the War of 1914. The Putsch's of Kapp-Luettwitz and of Ludendorff-Hitler followed in succession. Scores of combat or para-military organizations appeared. Hundreds of political assassinations took place. All these events occurred under the eyes of the Allies of Versailles who set up their 1918 peace provisions probably on the hypothesis that they would remain valid for a long time and that their control would prove to be effective.

On giving thought to the above, it is to be questioned whether

Instead of proclaiming such vague interdictions, it would not have been wiser to be more explicit and to act swiftly, i.e. to perform some sort of a surgical operation upon Germany in the spiritual field. In fact, a practical course should have been taken in secretly setting up a list of the most nationalistic organizations of which Germany should have been deprived and which could have been easily transported to the Allied countries.

The advantage gained would have been very great. The Allied nations would have succeeded in this way to lay the foundation for a better understanding of Germany. Today, as in the past, it is ignorance which is above all the source of "appeasement". In the great majority of countries - with the possible exception of France - the study on "Germanism" is a totally unknown discipline. Throughout the world the universities and high schools limit themselves to teaching German literature and music, i.e. the best subjects which Germany can export. As regards German politics, political history, geopolitics or "Wehrwissenschaft" (military science) a disquieting ignorance still exists, even after five years of war. It must be stressed that if by chance one encounters here or there an interest in these German sciences or the pseudo-sciences, it is generally Germans or crypto-Germans who are being called as experts.

It seems to us that after this second world war, such a state of affairs should change. It is even high time to reflect on this before the end of hostilities.

In the attached report we have tried to show the huge network set up by the German Reich since the end of the last century in order to regiment the thinking of its intellectual class. Hundreds

or millions have been spent in order to achieve this and thousands of university professors and teachers have contributed towards it. As a result of it, all the German ruling class had to do was to pick the fruits of their efforts for their aims of European or world hegemony.

In this connection it is interesting to note the names of high-ranking officers which appear in the registers of institutions which, a priori, would seem to have nothing in common with the army. They constitute a long litany of names such as: general von Massow, Faupel, von Epp, Thomas, Becker, Lorenz and others. Everywhere we can detect the hand of the General Staff, i.e. of those who have been the true masters of Prussia and Germany for almost a century.

Without all these organizations the Reich would never have been able to draw such dynamic energy from its people either in the first world war or in the second.

These German organizations and institutions must go.

The Armistice Treaty of tomorrow should, in our opinion, foresee provisions which would compel the Reich to:

- a) to surrender to the Inter-Allied Military Armistice Commission the entire inventory (including archives) of organizations, the list of which will be handed over to the Reich.
- b) to reconstruct at Germany's expense and under Allied supervision the libraries of organizations which the Reich would claim to be unavailable (e.g. on account of bombings).
- c) to transmit to the Allies throughout the period of occupation (i.e. during years) ten copies of every printed

publication, similarly to what is done in most countries in regard to the Department of Interior (so-called "exemplaires obligatoires").

d) in case of non-observance by the Reich, appropriate sanctions should be applied.

By way of conclusion let it be said that this report does not pretend to be complete. Its aim is simply to bring up a problem, the seriousness of which is obvious and in which a very large number of United Nations is simultaneously interested.

This is the more necessary as we don't believe in being optimistic as to the program of reeducation of the Germans after this war. There are two reasons for this attitude:

In the first place, in order that it may be possible to realize a program of re-education conceived in advance, there must be above all an identical outlook on life among the re-educators. In other words it would be necessary that the Great Powers which will have their say in this matter should have views on the "Weltanschauung" similar to those they would want to see accepted by the Germany of tomorrow. Freedom of the press or censorship? Diversity of political parties or, on the contrary, a mono-party system? Individualism or strict state-control? These are the problems of primary importance on which the Allies of today should be in accord before embarking upon the re-education of the German "bad boy" who has caused so much trouble in 1914 and 1939! To pose this question is equivalent to solving it, doubtless in a pessimistic sense. x)

cf. in that sense Leopold Schwarzschild in "Primer to Coming Victory" New York, 1946.

Besides, it would seem that if it takes 5 or 6 years to crush the III Reich by placing at the disposal of a defensive war of all allied energies in manpower and war material - how many more years will be needed to reeducate the Germans? Among them 13 million men, women and Hitler youth have joyously entered the war in 1939. Where shall we find them after they have gone underground following the defeat of Hitler which they shall never forgive us? It seems possible to control a factory or even statistics, but how much more difficult would it be to control the thought of a nationalist nation! The experience of more or less secret societies of the post-Versailles period permits one to anticipate that the Allies will once more run up against a camouflaged organization, more scientific and formidable than the last time. Such powerful means would have to be used, such a long time would be demanded and above all such a strong will on the part of the United Nations, that on this point also ^{it is} permissible to be pessimistic.

On the contrary, it is certain that, to secure peace, there must be the will in the future to investigate German militarism in all its forms, i.e., also the militaristic way of thinking.

Let us therefore leave the re-education to the conjuncture of events and do first things first, by accepting the thesis that the world is not sufficiently equipped to face the danger of German organization.

The essential point is that the victorious nations, conscious of the task which will be their tomorrow, be prepared to fulfill the task of organizing the investigation of German matters on an entirely new basis. It is the whole of Germany which, during and after this war, will have to be studied - the economic, financial,

-7-

social, military, geopolitical, historico-political Germany, etc. with all of its thinking and program of expansion. Before even starting to reeducate - it is necessary to know the subject which is to be reeducated.

Prof. Dr. M. Potulicki
Secretary General, Inter-Allied
Research Committee, London.

Washington, October 13, 1944.

To be prepared by each TSCD upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document.

● 讀者來信

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ACCESSION TO: <i>4/3</i>	
ACCESSION DATE: <i>11 December 48</i>	
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To: Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan

From: Anthony B. Kenkel

Subject: Establishing contacts with Catholic units in Germany
for the maintenance of social order after military
defeat of the Nazis.

recd 12/12/44

The inevitable crushing defeat of Hitler's armies will be followed by Nazi-directed guerrilla warfare against Allied forces completing the occupation of Germany. This resistance, too, will be wiped out, and the Nazi super-structure of totalitarian government will collapse completely. Its remnants, probably many of its arch-felons, will by then have crawled into hiding, from which to direct subversive activities against the occupying forces themselves and to carry on a reign of underground terror against Germans collaborating with the occupation authorities in maintaining civil peace and order.

The administration of Germany by the Allied armies of occupation will at the very start be seriously impeded, in some areas completely obstructed, by the waiter of social unrest accompanying the downfall of Nazi rule. More than 12 years of absolute regimentation of German life, and of ruthless persecution of all opposition even in Germany proper, have repressed so many counter-forces and accumulated such a volume of hatred, revenge, and the like, that the breaking of the Nazi whip, in ignominious defeat, may likely be the signal for an outbreak of bloody retribution and complete social chaos.

Regardless of any other considerations, anarchy in Germany during Allied control should be prevented, or mitigated as much as possible, for the reason that if it becomes rampant, it will add to our burden of effort and casualties, will prolong the occupation itself, and will be used by many elements to discredit the establishment of European peace and lawful government by democratic means.

This poses the problem of identifying and of contacting individual Germans or units that can be absolutely relied upon as nuclei of social stability and as supporters of law and order under Allied control. By principle and tradition, the Christian churches stand forth preëminent in this regard. Present concern has to do only with German Catholics, who in 1933 represented approximately one-third of the total population of Germany proper. The proportion of Catholics was even larger in certain parts of Germany; it was approximately 70 percent in Bavaria, 53 in Baden, 50 in the Prussian province of Westphalia, and 67 per-

cent in the Rhine Province. The 1935 census for the Saar showed that about 72 percent of that population was Catholic. The population of former Austria was also very largely Catholic. While the imposition by force of Nazi anti-Catholic ideologies on the one hand, and on the other the suppression of religious education and of the Catholic press, the expulsion of bishops, the imprisonment of priests, and the direct and indirect persecution of the faithful have undoubtedly tended to reduce and weaken the relative numbers of Catholics in Germany, nevertheless a large sub-stratum remains. This bed-rock of Catholicism can, if prudently supported, be used to prevent or minimize civil disorders and to further self-administration.

1.- The foremost difficulty involved in the problem is to establish contacts with most carefully selected German Catholic leaders and to work out a procedure for developing and supporting staunch local units in Germany. Many of these leaders, both clerics and laymen, are in hiding or in exile. As a first step, lists of names could be developed by consulting with certain Church dignitaries in the United States, and other countries, if need be, including the Provincials of religious orders represented in Germany. Such a list would have to be supplemented and checked in the Vatican City and Rome, and also in one or more Catholic centers in Switzerland. Direct contact with some of these Catholic refugees from Germany (as for instance, the Jesuit Father Muckermann in Rome) should prove helpful in developing lists of reliable persons still in Germany, for properly identifying them, and for obtaining an acquaintance with their activities.

From among the select names, a certain number would be expected to work in close collaboration with the representatives of O S S, in order to develop the necessary ways and means for establishing contacts in Germany and to give first-hand assistance in the preparation of materials for distribution and in properly "indoctrinating" and equipping those who eventually would work in Germany. Workshops for these activities would presumably be located in Switzerland, at Rome, and also in conjunction with Military Intelligence and with the European Advisory Commission.

2.- German prisoners of war, ascertained to be Catholics and carefully selected on the basis of trustworthiness, might well yield a fund of information concerning who's who in their native cities, towns, parishes, and neighborhoods. Such information would of course be checked and cross-checked, with Allied Military Intelligence and with the German collaborators. Sample information of this kind could first be gotten in P O W camps in this country. A larger and more up-to-date fund of information would become available from prisoners taken in the last stages of breaking down Nazi resistance.

3.- From all the sources indicated there must be developed a register of persons, units, and groups and a "Catholic intelligence directory" to guide us in making reliable contacts within Germany. This raises the second question

of the problem, that of selecting our representatives for the delicate task of beginning those contacts in Germany and of further dispersing our influence. Experience in the field and in the preparatory "workshops" must be relied upon to give the answers. If our own group includes German-speaking chaplains and Military Intelligence officers and if the refugees to be acquired as co-workers will also include both priests and laymen, the persons best suited to each particular task would not be difficult to select.

4.- The substance of the program of developing support for the Allied occupation authorities on the side of German Catholics, and the plans for its detailed execution, must also be developed in the workshop stage, beginning immediately after the first consultations with German Catholic leaders in exile. What to do and how to proceed can best be determined on the basis of careful analysis of each regional or local situation.

5.- The terms of reference included a point about German-speaking personnel, including secretary-typists, for the American group. Surely, Military Intelligence and the Civil Service Commission could comb the Government Departments and agencies for suitable material. Officers and chaplains stationed at P O W camps would also be able to furnish names of enlisted men or women with a speaking or good working knowledge of German. Induction centers in certain areas, as in the Middle West, may be expected to furnish additional material from which to select the more promising.

For the work in Europe, it will be advisable to allow for additions even to the clerical staff from selected foreigners. Their background and their more intimate knowledge of current European affairs and local matters may prove invaluable to the American staff.

*Respectfully submitted,
Anthony B. Kunkel*

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